Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill

Hon JOHN CARTER (Minister of Civil Defence) Link to this

I move, That the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill be now read a second time. I want to thank the Justice and Electoral Committee for its careful consideration of the bill. It is the first stage in the amalgamation of the functions of the three current electoral agencies into one. Currently, responsibility for electoral administration is split between the Chief Electoral Officer, the Electoral Commission, and the Chief Registrar of Electors through the Electoral Enrolment Centre.

This bill establishes a new Electoral Commission and transfers the functions of the current Chief Electoral Officer and Electoral Commission to it. The new Electoral Commission will be fully functional as of 1 October this year, in time to administer the next general election and the referendum on the MMP voting system. A second bill will follow this legislation, transferring the functions of the Chief Registrar of Electors to the new Electoral Commission in 2012.

The select committee initially received eight submissions that supported the bill’s aims of amalgamating the functions of the three electoral agencies. The core concerns identified by submitters centred on the independence of the electoral agency and its relationship with the executive and the House. A majority of the submissions recommended that the new electoral agency be established as an Officer of Parliament rather than an independent Crown entity, as the bill proposes.

On a related theme, a number of submissions proposed that the appointment and removal process for the new electoral commissioners be strengthened in some way. Others suggested that the Speaker should be the responsible Minister, or that the Electoral Commission should be able to provide advice on electoral matters directly to the House. To assist the committee in its consideration of these matters, it sought further advice from Mr David McGee QC, who is the previous Clerk of the House and a current Ombudsman; the chief executive of the Electoral Commission; and the Officers of Parliament Committee.

As a result, the select committee recommended that the new Electoral Commission should still be established as an independent Crown entity with a number of additional safeguards. First, the commissioners are to be appointed or removed by the Governor-General on a recommendation from the House of Representatives rather than by the Minister of Justice per se. Given the important constitutional role of the commissioners, the Minister of Justice had earlier added the requirement for the Minister of Justice to consult other parliamentary parties prior to making an appointment. However, I welcome the recommendation to make this process even more transparent by putting the appointment motion to the House, thereby creating a strong incentive to ensure that the candidates enjoy the confidence of a broad cross-section of parties.

The committee also supports a suggestion made by Mr McGee that the Standing Orders Committee be invited to develop an appointment protocol for these and similar appointments made by the House. Second, the committee recommends adding a new power to enhance the new Electoral Commission’s independence and effectiveness to enable the commission to provide information and advice to the Minister or the House, of its own volition and at any time. This new power will complement other functions already provided for in the bill to enable the Minister or the House to seek the commission’s advice and for the commission to provide a post-election report to the House. A new function of the commission is to make information available in order to assist parties, candidates, and others to help them meet their statutory obligations in respect of electoral matters.

I trust that the amendments to the appointment, removal, and advisory functions will allay many of the concerns of submitters regarding the independence of the Electoral Commission from the executive. However, I remind the House that these safeguards will accompany many other mechanisms that already protect the status of independent Crown entities. These include the Electoral Commission’s statutory duty of independence and the inability of the Minister to direct the Electoral Commission to give effect, or have regard, to Government policy.

Although the Officer of Parliament model, given its independent status, appeared to be an attractive alternative for the new Electoral Commission, the committee ultimately decided that it was not a good fit for the function of the commission. Officers of Parliament such as the Ombudsmen and the Auditor-General provide a check on the arbitrary use of power by the executive, whereas the core role of the proposed Electoral Commission is the provision of electoral services.

It must be remembered that the overall aim of this bill is to improve the administration of elections by providing for a single agency to be established with that responsibility. A further change recommended by the committee, which is also supported by the Government, provides that each of the electoral commissioners has a distinct role—the chairperson, the deputy chairperson, and the Chief Electoral Officer.

The commission considered submissions on a number of other areas, but recommended no other substantive change to the bill. I support the approach taken by the Justice and Electoral Committee in consideration of this bill and the unanimous recommendations, which reflect careful consideration. I also thank all of those who took the time to submit or provide advice on the bill, which is all the stronger for it. I commend this bill to the House.

Hon DAVID PARKER (Labour) Link to this

Labour supports this bill, the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill. I will address the issue that the Minister, John Carter, has just spoken on, which is the issue as to the structure of this new organisation. Listeners will have heard from the Minister that this new entity called the Electoral Commission takes over functions that were previously the functions of the Chief Electoral Officer and the Electoral Commission. Those two offices are merged into this one. The question that the Justice and Electoral Committee had to grapple with, as the Government had to grapple with, is what the proper form of that entity should be.

That is an important question. The administration of elections in a democracy has to be seen to be impartial. We have to maintain confidence in the impartiality of election processes in order to maintain confidence of the people in democracy. There is the old saying that “The only thing worse than democracy is the alternatives”, which is another way of saying that democracy is incredibly important—incredibly important. If we look at the countries that have got the most problems in the world we see that by and large they do not have the benefit of democracy. They do not have the checks and balances that come with democracy. If Governments make a mistake in our system and they get it too far wrong, the people have the right to vote them out. They get a new Government and those problems are fixed—or some of those problems are fixed; there is no such thing as perfection.

The choices that we effectively had for the entity that was being formed were an independent Crown entity, which is a Crown entity but it sits independent of the executive in the way that it administers itself. The other choice of the final two choices was an Officer of Parliament. Officers of Parliament currently include the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment and the Auditor-General, to name but two. There are also the Ombudsmen.

The submissions that we had in favour of the Officer of Parliament model were very well considered. They were very fulsome. They came from some eminent specialists in this area. Professor Andrew Geddis was one of them. The New Zealand Law Society’s submissions supported that outcome, as well as did various other submitters. They pointed out that if it was an officer of Parliament, the organisation would be accountable to Parliament rather than accountable to the executive. They thought that that was better than an independent Crown entity, which has some responsibilities back to the Minister. There was some strength in that argument. As a committee, we were quite attracted to the argument for a while.

We sought further advice on the issue, but, in the end, we were persuaded in large part by the advice by Dave McGee QC, a long-serving Clerk of this House before he retired from that role and became an Ombudsman. He made a number of points as to why the Officer of Parliament group was inappropriate, and those are detailed in the select committee report. They include some theoretical concerns about the involvement of the Speaker in terms of officers of Parliament and that the Speaker ought not to be put in positions that would be inappropriate. He also pointed out that there are quite a number of administrative functions that this new entity has that are inconsistent with the normal model for officers of Parliament. For those and other reasons that he detailed he was strongly of the view that we would be wrong to create an Officer of Parliament in part because he thought that it would undermine the conventions that have already developed on the use of the Officer of Parliament model and where it is appropriate.

Of course, in New Zealand we do not have a written constitution. The conventions of this Parliament and the conventions of the various institutions of both Government and the courts are important parts of the actual constitution that we have in New Zealand. The convention on the appointment of officers of Parliament is another important convention that we ought to not lightly undermine. Dave McGee’s advice was that to create this entity as an Officer of Parliament would undermine the conventions that have developed.

For those reasons the committee was persuaded that the proper model was the independent Crown entity model. But we did agree on an additional protection that was not found in the original version of the bill that came to the select committee. That concerned how we appoint members of that new Electoral Commission. The provision in the bill as it came to the select committee was that they would be appointed by the Minister. We thought that that was wrong. We thought that the Minister could be, and would be seen to be, potentially conflicted and might prefer the interests of his or her own party over the interests of the independence of the people who are appointed to those roles.

For that reason the committee recommended, and the Government has agreed, that the members of the independent Crown entity ought to be appointed by the Governor-General at the recommendation of the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives is representative of more than just the Government; the Opposition parties are also represented. There will be strong incentives on the House of Representatives to make recommendations that are not biased in favour of the interests of any one party. We think that that is a good balance to have reached.

We had another submission from Mr Geddis that I feel that I should record. He thought that the Electoral Commission should be one person rather than three. He thought that in practice during elections decisions are required quickly of the Electoral Commission and that that was one of the problems we had with the prior model— implementing fast decisions for the benefit of participants in the election, clarifying areas of uncertainty during the electoral process. He thought that that would be best handled by one commissioner rather than three commissioners.

One of the submitters we heard from was Mr Henry. I forget whether he is a former Chief Electoral Officer or a former Electoral Commissioner. I think he is a former Chief Electoral Officer, but someone can correct me if I have got that wrong. In any event, he submitted to us that in reality the day-to-day decisions on what should be done in respect of advertisements, donation rules, and all those sorts of things will be delegated to the executive of this new organisation rather than be at the commission level, and that in the rare event where decisions are required from the commission, rather than falling within the delegation of people working for the commission, it was quite proper that the three commissioners be called together and meet on the issue. He did not think it would so frequent an occurrence as to be impractical or unduly expensive. For those reasons, we stuck with the status quo of three representatives.

I want to refer to one other issue and it is what this bill does not fix up, and that is a glaring omission in our electoral laws to have proper transparency around donations. This was an area where the Government has refused to be part of a consensus. It says there is no consensus, but the only reason there is not a consensus is that the Government will not agree to one. If it were to agree on reasonable rules around transparency, we would have them. But the reality in New Zealand is that we do not have transparency around donations to electoral parties.

At the last election we knew the source of less than 10 percent of the funds used by parties in elections, and that is not good enough. We need transparency around donations in order to maintain public confidence in our electoral processes. If we do not, we can never escape the imputation that there is policy for purchase. We do not know what influence has been bought by donors. Donating to political parties is a perfectly proper and worthy thing to do, but it ought to be transparent. There is no shame in making a donation. There should be no shame in transparency of donations so that we can maintain public confidence in our electoral processes. I think it is a great shame that the Government has not addressed that issue.

CHESTER BORROWS (National—Whanganui) Link to this

I rise to take a call in this debate on the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill. I thank the members of the Justice and Electoral Committee. This is the 13th bill we have returned to the House this term. The work of the committee, and the collaboration and willingness of its members to get good results for the people of New Zealand, is reflected in the number of bills we have returned. As has been well outlined by the Minister of Justice in his introduction and by the previous speaker, the Hon David Parker, in the consideration on this bill we went through a number of concerns and issues raised by members of the public and by learned submitters. We took all of those submissions seriously and received further advice. We went to a number of other areas to seek advice on the matters that were raised.

The bill amalgamates into one agency the three electoral agencies that currently exist. For the reasons well outlined by the previous speaker, the new Electoral Commission will be an independent Crown entity, in spite of a number of submissions suggesting that that role should be an Officer of Parliament. The bill seeks to overcome current issues around duplication of work, the confusion with overlapping jurisdictions, the increased costs of having to deal with different Government agencies around the same issue of elections, and the removal of complexity for stakeholders—that is, political parties, voters, policy groups, pressure groups, and list and constituency candidates—within the framework as it currently stands.

The submissions were very technical and we appreciate the fact that submitters went to such trouble not only in researching their well-worded submissions but also in the way in which they spoke to them in front of the committee. In any event, we have ended up reporting the bill back to the House with only two significant matters in respect of the way the bill was when it was referred to us. One of those was to confirm the independent Crown entity status of the new commission, and the second was the way in which the commissioners will be appointed on a basis of consensus rather than the Minister of Justice making a flat decision. I believe it is important for the integrity of future elections to have consensus around the House on who the commissioner would be, and also for the various parties not only to be consulted on but also to consent to the decision. I commend the bill to the House and I thank the committee for its work.

LYNNE PILLAY (Labour) Link to this

Along with my colleagues on the Justice and Electoral Committee I am happy to take a call on the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill and to acknowledge and confirm the points made by Chester Borrows about the hard-working committee. This bill was no exception and a lot of work was done on it. It was given a lot of scrutiny, much of it around the status of the new Electoral Commission. As a member of the committee I can say that having a commission that is one entity has always been seen as the best way forward. Indeed, many people have lobbied about what a good idea it would be, and I think it has always been the intention. So on this occasion I commend the Government as I think this is very sensible legislation.

I also acknowledge the agencies that have worked so hard and have done so much work around our elections. Although I did not like the result of the last one—and, indeed, most New Zealanders do not now—I acknowledge the work that was done by those agencies. There was the Chief Electoral Officer, we had assistance from David Henry during our consideration, the Electoral Commission, and also the officers of the Chief Registrar of Electors through the Electoral Enrolment Centre. It is a really good chance at this time to acknowledge all the work they do.

Living in a democracy, there are things that cause us some concern. Participation, not by the agencies themselves but by third parties who tend to get involved in election campaigns, is perhaps not something that we in New Zealand feel proud of—and certainly members on the other side of the House should feel really ashamed of that. But we are not here to talk about that negative stuff today; we are here to talk about the good work that those agencies have done throughout numerous elections. Save for a few glitches that happen from time to time, I do not think anyone in this House would question the commitment of those agencies.

Indeed, going forward to having one electoral agency, which will be in place for the next election in 2011, we will then have one commission, and the duplication or the confusion that can arise when we have three agencies will certainly not be such a challenge. Certainly, we on this side of the House are looking forward to the next election—very much so. We are really looking forward to it and we are looking forward to it being run in such a way—[Interruption] There is a little bit of passion from members opposite. Bring it on! We are looking forward to that election being run in such way that we celebrate the democracy we have in New Zealand. [Interruption] Goodness—I think I have woken up members opposite.

As others have said, most of the bill is technical; indeed most of the discussions were very technical. I acknowledge the really, really excellent submissions that the committee received from individuals, and also from the previous executive of the Electoral Commission. The previous Clerk of the House of Representatives, David McGee, played a key role in giving us really, really constructive advice. We heard from Professor Andrew Geddis, who is renowned for his knowledge and has always played a very constructive role in other submissions that the Justice and Electoral Committee received when it was considering electoral law. There was also the New Zealand Law Society and other individuals who put a lot of time and effort into commenting and offering constructive advice on the bill.

One of the key issues, and indeed many submitters submitted on this, was about ensuring protection, so that there was no politics—if I can use that term in respect of the office. That is why many of the submitters submitted that the new Electoral Commission should be an officer of Parliament. I think it would be fair to say that that is something that the committee gave the most consideration to. As I said before, we had very good advice from David McGee and also David Henry—the Davids, as it were—on this. One of the concerns was that the officer of Parliament role was more a scrutinising of the executive whereas the Electoral Commission’s main responsibility is more of a doing role—it is about delivering impartial and transparent elections in accordance with the law in order to maintain public confidence in our electoral processes. So the committee gave really careful consideration to that. We realised that although the request was for an officer of Parliament, the advice we were given was that it was not appropriate in this instance—it was really important not to have that conflict.

That is why some additional protection was recommended by the committee in that the appointment of the commissioners would not be by the Minister, in case that Minister could be conflicted. Whether or not there was a conflict, there could be a perception that there was political interference, and there was certainly a complete meeting of the minds that whether or not that was happening we on the committee would not want that perception to be there. The best way of ensuring that did not happen was seen to be by having the appointment made not by the Minister but by Parliament itself. As Chester Borrows has said, it would not be about consultation, it would be a decision that Parliament as a whole would make. The members of the select committee felt that went a long way to put at rest any concerns that submitters had on that issue.

There was also another protection in terms of the membership of the Electoral Commission. The bill as introduced provided that the three members were appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, as I said before. They will now be appointed by Parliament. The board’s structure for the new Electoral Commission relates to that of the existing commission before the 2008 general election. Before the election, the existing Electoral Commission required its board to meet and consider its response to complaints. We think that is really important. We are looking this time for the commission to be a completely new entity. It is really important that this legislation is enacted now to enable us to get all of the checks, balances, and processes in place to get the commission selected by Parliament, up and running, and effective in time for the next election.

In closing I congratulate the Government; I think there has been consultation on this bill. But more electoral bills will be brought before this House, and I very, very respectfully urge the Government to consider transparency around donations. That and other issues are very important. I commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

METIRIA TUREI (Co-Leader—Green) Link to this

The Green Party supports the Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill. I do not want to take too much of the House’s time this afternoon to talk about it, but I think it is important to raise some issues that concern us that were not addressed by the Justice and Electoral Committee.

The first was the issue that my colleague from Labour Lynne Pillay has just been talking about, which is what kind of body this commission set up to manage our electoral process—in which citizens make one of the most significant decisions that citizens can make in any country, and one fiercely defended and fought for—should be. How independent should it be from Parliament? What should be its status? We were strongly of the view that the new Electoral Commission should be an Officer of Parliament. I have read through the select committee justification for why that was not the case, and I have been in other meetings where we have discussed this issue. I am not convinced that it is inappropriate for an Officer of Parliament role to be accorded here. There is a requirement that an Officer of Parliament provide a check on the arbitrary use of power by the executive, and the justification for not having an Officer of Parliament system was that the Electoral Commission would not be responsible for scrutinising the executive. But in my view, those two things are different. Being a check on the arbitrary use of power is different from scrutinising the executive.

The purpose of electoral law management, which is what this commission does, is to make sure that the rules are undertaken fairly and in accordance with the law. The role of having a check on the arbitrary use of powers by the executive is to make sure that the executive, which is the Government at the time and therefore has the numbers to make any law it chooses at any time it chooses, does not interfere with a fair and democratic process. Why would we not enable a commission, whose job it is to manage that fair electoral process, to act as a check on the arbitrary use of power that could interfere with that process for something as significant as electing our most senior political officials and representatives of the people. We still remain concerned and unconvinced that it is inappropriate for this role to be held as an Officer of Parliament. We are very pleased to see that the independent appointment process is included, so appointments to the Electoral Commission are made separately from the executive, from Government—we think that is a very good step that the select committee has supported.

Finally, though, we are concerned that there is no recommendation to amend the bill to give the Electoral Commission powers to provide advice and guidance on electoral financing rules. Today legislation looking at electoral finance has been tabled. It has been a murky area for many years, with lots and lots of loopholes, some of which were very recently, in 2005, exploited by members of the community and by political interests to try to win an election through the use of excessive amounts of money. We know that those loopholes are actually very difficult to close, so we must take real care around electoral finance legislation. And in taking care in building the rules, we then have to have some certainty for all the political players—political parties and third parties that engage in electioneering and campaigning—on what those rules mean, and clear parameters for what they can and cannot do.

The consequences for political players, if they breach the rules, can be very, very severe, and could impact on the results of an election and the formation of a Government. That is no small thing. So we need to be sure that all the political players have certainty over the rules: what the rules mean, how they should be applied, and whether that party—whether it is a political party or a third party—is acting within those rules. No organisation is responsible for providing clear advice and guidance, because the select committee has not given the Electoral Commission that role. That is a mistake. It will lead to the only alternative, which is that political parties and political players will have to resort to the courts to determine the interpretation of legislation and the application of the rules to their particular case.

If we go down that path, we are talking about court case after court case. We see them every election period; they happen every election period. Some of them could be very, very serious, affecting whether a Government can form. These cases will have to go all the way through the court process to the Supreme Court level before they can be finally resolved, causing ridiculous amounts of political and financial chaos, and chaos in the constitutional system, simply because we have not given the right and the power to make decisions that can guide the use of those rules to the one body that we can give it to. It is a hole in this process that could be filled and should be filled. If it was, it would save considerable difficulty, particularly at a time when we are still working through what the best sets of electoral financing rules that we should have in this country are to make sure we have a transparent and fair level playing field in the election of our Government.

I think this is a serious opportunity that has been missed. There is no other way to fill that gap now that this legislation is to be passed. It will cause real problems in the future, and we will continue to see those problems. We can only hope that the electoral finance laws that will eventually come out of the Justice and Electoral Committee when we manage the other legislation that has been introduced today will provide some high levels of certainty. But, as I say, there can never be absolute certainty in this environment. I think that that is an opportunity missed, and will cause real problems for us in the future, as we work through those rules. Nonetheless, it is better that this is done. The reorganisation is good; we support that reorganisation, and we will support the bill. Thank you.

RAHUI KATENE (Māori Party—Te Tai Tonga) Link to this

Issues of electoral integrity are of special interest to every party in this House, so we join with other speakers to acknowledge the important work being done in this Electoral (Administration) Amendment Bill. It is with real pleasure that we come to this bills in the wave of almost universal support across the House last night to address tobacco use, and we note the widespread support across Parliament today for the legislative process around this bill. It is great to be experiencing the politics of consensus rather than the politics of conflict.

The quality of the administration of by-elections and general elections is a vital component of an effective electoral system. Efficient administration can enhance equitable democratic participation, a goal that we in the Māori Party have a keen interest in promoting. The Māori Party was formed as a channel through which Māori could direct their interest in Government to achieve participation in Parliament. Our existence addresses the first issue, and we hope that electoral administration will work in a way to ensure that all New Zealanders can have confidence in the system with which they place their votes. Yet our experience out in the world is that we have been disappointed in the way in which the system operates as it has not always been efficient or integrated. The structure of the three agencies has not always been well understood by voters. The potential for confusion over which agency has responsibility for what has been evident, and we have been unconvinced that the complexity of the tripartite arrangement has been helpful.

Several administrative problems have arisen in Māori electorates, which, although isolated, we believe should have been avoided. My colleague Hone Harawira told me that in the 2005 election, voting papers ran out in several polling places in Te Tai Tokerau by mid-afternoon on polling day. It appears that a tangihanga had taken place, bringing an influx of mourners into the area, and there was an inadequate supply of ballot papers to cope. In the Tāmaki Makaurau electorate, in that same election, some voting papers were not available for voters on the Māori roll in the South Auckland area until mid-morning. In Manurewa, there had been a lack of Māori electoral rolls for a couple of hours, as well. In other electorates, electorate votes were disallowed because incorrect voting papers were issued. Concerns were also raised about reported instances of voters being confused about whether they were on the Māori roll or general roll. Those are just a few of the complaints that we have received, pertaining to the administration of elections.

Other matters have caused offence, such as the incorrect pronunciation of Māori names by issuing officers in some polling places. It is not just a problem of causing offence; the problem is that if people are called an incorrect name—for example, I often get called “Mrs Ka-teen”, or things like that—they will not recognise their names and will not respond. These are real problems for us. As a political party, the Māori Party has taken these issues, as appropriate, to either the Chief Electoral Officer or the Electoral Commission. Sometimes local representatives have raised their concerns with Electoral Enrolment Centre personnel. In general, we have always been satisfied with the responses received, but there is always a risk that in sharing concerns with one agency, it might have been more appropriate to share with another, or that a strategic response to the issues is limited by the fact that all of the key players are not in the same room together.

When the idea to split the three agencies first came up in the inquiry into the 2005 general election, we were not supportive. We know that many of our members appreciated the way in which the Electoral Enrolment Centre operated locally and was in touch with its community. The view at that time was that to replace its functions with a single Wellington-based operation would be detrimental. We also thought that to move to a single body would be an enormous task that would not be easily achieved without a risk of disruption to elections. It was our view that any changes should be contemplated with great caution. However, as we thought further about the value of creating an amalgamated electoral administrative entity, we have warmed to the idea of reducing the duplication of functions, the confusion, and the costs and complexities for political parties, candidates, and the general public. In light of our earlier concerns, we also support the phasing in of the changes to ensure that we minimise any disruption, particularly to the successful operation of the 2011 general election.

If we could be so bold, we would like to recommend some immediate priorities for the work programme for the new Electoral Commission. We support the thrust of many of the public submissions that said that the Electoral Commission could play a crucial role in informing and educating the public about the pros and cons of the various voting systems, including MMP, first past the post, Single Transferable Vote, etc. Dr Helena Catt was particularly positive about the inclusion of a clear education role for the new entity, and the recognition of a role in encouraging participation. I want to draw particular attention to the submission from the Nelson Bays Community Law Service, not just because it is in Nelson—I am from Nelson, and the best people come from Nelson—but also because it had something really good to say. Its submission articulated its wish for the new commission to be in a better position to prevent the issues that confronted Māori voters in the last election. The Nelson experience reinforced our finding that in some polling booths there were an insufficient number of Māori roll voting papers and there was a lack of Māori roll data. It was the service’s view that both issues would have been extremely easy to rectify, yet a lack of information had the immediate and adverse impact of compromising the right of individual Māori to vote.

Another point the service raised was the suggestion that participation in democracy by our youth would be encouraged if all New Zealanders were automatically entered on the general roll at 18 years of age or older, or, if Māori, entered on the Māori roll with the option to transfer to the general roll. This is a great idea. In fact, it is an idea that can be found in the Māori Party policy manifesto, He Aha Te Mea Nui. Combining these two ideas—the need to promote the value of voting as a concept of a healthy democracy and the issue about raising the youth vote—leads me to suggest that the new Electoral Commission could gain considerable value through looking at the campaign to get people enrolling and voting that took place in the United States. We have a large number of Māori who are not enrolled, particularly young voters. Some estimations of the 2008 campaign put the figure at around 100,000 people who were not enrolled in the vital age group between 18 and 35 years old. This could be an area where the electoral agencies could invest in schools, including kura kaupapa Māori, to promote the message that every vote counts.

Another issue that we would like to put forward to enhance the role of the new Electoral Commission is the one around cultural competency. As I have noted, there were concerns at some booths about the accuracy of the Māori roll and how election-day staff dealt with their needs. There were particular instances where staff failed to search for Māori voters on the Māori roll, and, as a consequence, gave them general roll forms. These were voters who came to the booth without their early vote cards. The default position tended to be that they were immediately assumed to be general roll voters. In some of our electorates there were people, including kuia and koroua, who needed assistance but there was a lack of resources at booths to encourage them to ask for help. Another issue that came through to us about election day was the significant queues. In some cases, where there were long queues of voters standing in the Māori roll line, some of these voters became impatient and left. Our view is that we should be doing everything we can to encourage voters, and time delays do nothing to promote that. It is felt that some training in how to engage with Māori, to ensure successful face-to-face contact, would be invaluable.

All these matters of detail are important, and there are many more. We are pleased to support the second reading of this bill and we look forward to further debate on such a crucial issue.

SIMON BRIDGES (National—Tauranga) Link to this

We have heard some erudite and learned speeches this afternoon, but none was better than the speech made by Lynne Pillay. She made some very good points about the fact that we are getting a unified Electoral Commission, and she said that she cannot wait for the next election to try it out. I think that is fine; that is good. All I am saying to members on the other side is to make sure they are not in the mid to high 30s on the list. In fact, Jacinda Ardern, Maryan Street, and Carmel Sepuloni—

JACINDA ARDERN (Labour) Link to this

I am very glad to now know, or to have learnt, where Simon Bridges’ inspiration for becoming a lawyer came from. It was from The Castle. I think that that filled in a few gaps for me, so I thank him for that.

I will start by saying that all of my colleagues have mentioned our appreciation of the level of consultation that has gone into the development of this bill. I guess I would say that long may that consultation continue, because we anticipate that coming before us soon is some electoral legislation that probably, in the grand scheme of things, will be even more significant in the way that it will impact on each and every one of us. More important, it will impact on the general public.

The select committee approached the analysis of this bill with two key objectives in mind, and I think that that probably unified our work. There was the ultimate goal of transparency, in the way that our electoral matters are conducted in New Zealand, and also the idea of public confidence. We approached all our discussions with the idea of judging whether the legislation instilled confidence in the public that transparent, free, and fair elections would be undertaken in New Zealand. I think we probably have reached that point with this particular bill. I shall reserve judgment on any future legislation about the transparency of donations.

The point I will dwell on most, though, is probably that which some other speakers have talked about. I think that submitters, from their perspective, will be most interested in how we decided to choose the entity type we did for overseeing electoral matters in New Zealand. That new body, of course, is the Electoral Commission, which will be an independent Crown entity, so I will dwell on the justification used by the select committee to settle on the Crown entity model because, as some of my colleagues have mentioned, very strong cases were put before us to advocate that the new commission be an Officer of Parliament, instead. It might seem from an outsider’s perspective that that is not a significant point of difference, but there were some differences, and I will go over those.

I also say up front that some of the submitters had some scepticism that perhaps the Ministry of Justice had not provided us with an adequate breakdown of the rationale behind the Crown entity model. I will just allay those concerns by saying at the outset that if from the submitters’ perspective it did not seem as if those justifications were provided, we certainly asked for the justifications. As a committee we certainly held the ministry to task, and it certainly provided us with the information required to make this decision.

A lot of persuasive arguments were made around the idea of the new commission being an Officer of Parliament, but ultimately the evidence produced by David McGee in particular was pretty compelling, and that has been touched on by my colleague the Hon David Parker. From the outset it was explained to the committee that the Finance and Expenditure Committee had already, in the course of its business, determined the two criteria that have traditionally sat around the establishment of an Officer of Parliament. The first is the requirement that an Officer of Parliament provides a check on the arbitrary use of power by the executive. We discussed at great length the point that the Electoral Commission’s primary role would be the responsibility of delivering quite a wide range of electoral services, but by and large its key role would be the responsibility to deliver impartial and transparent elections in accordance with the law. I think that when we contrast that with the role of the other Officers of Parliament, the Ombudsmen, the Controller and Auditor-General, and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, we see they have a much more direct scrutiny role of the executive in power at that particular time.

Probably, if we draw on some of the comments we heard from an Officer of Parliament, we can really see that coming to the fore. For instance, the Parliamentary Officer for the Environment just this week came out and presented a view on the Government’s proposals on mining. It was quite a critical review. I think that she called the Government’s proposals vague. I think there was also criticism of the cost-benefit analysis. It was quite a damning report, I would have thought, from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, so we see in that the key scrutiny role that an Officer of Parliament plays. I think that in the Electoral Commission we are probably looking for a much more functional role, a role that is involved in policy development and the like, and something that is probably quite different in terms of our expectations.

If the Electoral Commission were to be established as an Officer of Parliament, it would also mean that the Speaker would then be accountable to Parliament for its operation. We have to take into account the practicalities of that: the role that the Speaker already has, and his or her responsibility with regard to the House. The Speaker has a number of responsibilities. The Speaker already oversees the Office of the Clerk, the Office of the Ombudsmen, the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General, and other Officers of Parliament. It would probably be an unreasonable expectation to put such a weighty body under the arm of the Speaker—not to mention, I think, that there are some conflicts in that proposal in and of itself. We took that additional accountability structure, then, into account in our decision making. We also discussed the board structure of the Electoral Commission, and that as well would be a departure from the way in which Officers of Parliament exist now.

I guess, ultimately, that the select committee approached this matter from the perspective of asking what elements already existing for an Officer of Parliament submitters wished us to hold and carry over into the way the Electoral Commission would operate, if we could approach it from a different angle. So we made some changes to the legislation relating to the appointment process for the people who would be on the board of the Electoral Commission, in order to add some greater transparency, which is what I think submitters were seeking from us.

I will come back to just one more point, though—because again this is about a differentiation in the Crown entity model versus that of the Officer of Parliament—and that is our expectation that the new electoral agency will have a role in the development of policies related to electoral administration, or an advisory role in reporting directly to the Minister with regard to the administration of the Electoral Act and related legislation. Again, the example I have already drawn on from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment shows, I think, the distinction between that very strong scrutiny role and the role that we expect, which is much more of a policy development role.

Having said that, I tell the House that we did not want to create a situation where the Electoral Commission was not able to raise with a Minister the concerns or issues that might exist relating to the operation of our electoral law. We recommended inserting a new section that allows the Electoral Commission to provide information and advice to the Minister at any time and on the commission’s own volition—it does not have to be asked to provide that information; it can trigger that process itself—and, for the sake of transparency, the Electoral Commission can also set out a process whereby it can ensure that that information, if it so wishes, is tabled in the House within a set time frame.

I will touch quickly on the membership of the Electoral Commission. A concern was raised in the select committee that inappropriate people, who perhaps demonstrated some bias, might be appointed to this really important body. Some people specifically submitted that former politicians should not be eligible for the board. To emphasise the independence of the board, we recommended replacing section 4D, under clause 4 of the bill, and putting in place a new appointment process for the Electoral Commission that involves an appointment by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives. I hope that that process will cover off any concerns that were raised with the select committee over the neutrality of the people being appointed to that body. I think that when we involve members from across the House, we are more inclined to get that kind of outcome, and we demonstrate from time to time the ability to do that.

All in all, finally I reiterate my thanks to all of those who submitted and gave their expertise to the select committee. I just highlight once again the importance of the Government continuing to consult all parties in this House, on an ongoing basis, on the very important electoral reform that will come before us.