Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill

Hon PETE HODGSON (Minister of Health) Link to this

I move, That the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I intend to move that the bill be referred to the Justice and Electoral Committee for consideration.

The bill has a history in this House and many members will be familiar with its provisions. It is directed against party hopping, or waka jumping—the situation where an MP ceases to be a member of the political party for which he or she was elected to Parliament at the last general election, either to become an Independent MP or to defect to another political party. The legislation has its roots in a member’s bill that Dr Cullen moved in 1999. It was reintroduced in 2000 by the Government, and passed as the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001, because circumstances showed there was a real need to bring stability to parliamentary arrangements. In the two Parliaments before the last Act was introduced, a total of 22 MPs defected from the parties for which they were elected. This was unacceptable to the general public, particularly because the MPs concerned often used their votes quite irresponsibly to tip the balance of power. In short, the amount of party hopping that occurred prior to 2001 brought Parliament into disrepute.

Under the MMP electoral system that New Zealand has adopted, voters have a right to expect that the parties they elect to Parliament will remain in the same proportion for the next 3 years. The previous Act had a sunset clause, and it lapsed at the last general election. The Government has agreed to support reintroduction of the legislation in order to allow the current Parliament to decide whether it is an arrangement that should be reinstated permanently.

The legislation sets up a very simple mechanism: where a parliamentarian ceases to be a member of the political party that he or she stood for at the last election, the bill provides a procedure that allows the seat to be declared vacant by the Speaker. A member can notify the Speaker that he or she has left the political party; alternatively, the leader of that member’s parliamentary party can notify the Speaker that he or she believes that the member has distorted the proportionality of Parliament and is likely to continue to do so. The leader needs the support of two-thirds of the caucus to give such a notice, so there is a built-in safeguard that ensures the leader is acting with the support of a significant majority.

Experience has shown that the measures have been very effective in halting the avalanche of defections. The number of defections and resignations from parties has been very small over the past 4 years, and we have seen considerably greater stability in Parliament. Equally important, public confidence in the institution has improved. The public can now trust the electoral process to deliver enduring, stable arrangements that reflect their decisions at the ballot box.

A lot of criticism was levelled at the legislation when it was introduced in 2000. Since that time, however, the legislation has been road-tested. Four years of practical experience have shown that many of the criticisms were misplaced, and the legislation has a really positive impact on the stability of Parliament.

With this background, it may be worthwhile to respond to some of the early criticisms. One criticism of the legislation, when it was introduced last time, was that New Zealand was embarking on a different path from that of most other countries. At that time the countries that had anti-defection legislation were dismissed as a handful of banana republics, but the reality is that more than 30 jurisdictions have introduced legislative restrictions on MPs who defect from, or otherwise part ways with, the party they were voted in on. This is across a range of electoral systems, including a plural majority system, MMP, and proportional representation. The truth is that such legislation has been used internationally as countries find it necessary to ensure stability in their electoral arrangements.

There was also a criticism that the arrangements would give too much power to political parties. The fear was that there would be a chilling effect on freedom of expression, and that this would undermine democracy. In truth, this criticism was made without a proper understanding of modern government and the nature of MMP. The reality is that MMP Parliaments, quite unlike those under the first-past-the-post system, are made up of a number of parties with a plurality of views. Minority Governments are the norm, and this means that debate on legislation occurs much more intensively on the floor of the House than it ever did before. Select committees are made up of a much broader range of parties, and those committees have become a very active forum in which views are expressed on legislation. There is also regular consultation with other parties on policy, so a range of viewpoints are built in before bills even reach the House. In contrast to the criticism that was made of the electoral integrity amendments then, debate on legislation has been alive and well over the past 4 years. This is because freedom of expression is built into the MMP environment.

There was also uncertainty about how the legislation would be interpreted by the courts. Since the Act was passed, the electoral integrity provisions have been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Prebble and Ors v . I am sure the select committee will want to look at the bill and see whether that decision justifies any modifications to it. Justice Keith, in particular, gave a very considered judgment, and it may be worthwhile recording some of the points he made. He documented the history of political parties in New Zealand, and indicated that under MMP the party is more important than it ever was before. However, he did not consider that the electoral integrity amendments would place too much power in the hands of political parties and lead to a chilling of freedom of expression. Members may be interested in what he said in this respect: “Because of the dominant role of party, their freedom of expression is for the most part to be exercised within caucus and other party processes. The central role of party, already well established by 1993, has been enhanced by the introduction of a proportional electoral system.”

Another point that is worth emphasising is the way the bill deals with constituency members and list members. One criticism made about the electoral integrity amendments the last time they were in the House was that they should distinguish between constituency MPs and list MPs. It is true that the bill itself makes no distinction between the two types of parliamentarian, but there are real differences in the way each is treated upon defecting from their party. Where a constituency MP’s seat becomes vacant under the bill, there is a by-election. The MP is entitled to stand again and test the will of the voters about his or her decision to defect from the party he or she was originally voted in on. In contrast, where a list MP’s seat becomes vacant under the bill, the next person on the party list is promoted to Parliament. There is no by-election, and the MP must wait until the next general election to test his or her mandate. This is a neat solution, because it reflects the electoral mandate that attaches to each type of MP. Constituency MPs are voted in on a combination of party and electorate support. It seems fair that they should be entitled to test their mandate with the constituency immediately, if they defect. List MPs, in contrast, are voted in purely on party grounds. Where they defect, they arguably have very little mandate to remain in Parliament as Independent MPs, or as part of any other political party. They should wait until the next general election before receiving the opportunity to start again.

Finally, we should not let ourselves be confused by arguments about the application of Edmund Burke’s philosophy in this debate. The last time that electoral integrity amendments were in the House, some members suggested that the bill cut across his ideas about representative democracy. Those contributions simply showed that members had not gone away and read Burke’s essays. Burke was a political philosopher who wrote in the 18th century. The environment was completely different, with the Westminster political system only just beginning to take on its modern form. At that time, English members of the House of Commons were often nominees of landed gentry, and were expected to vote in the House according to the view of their sponsor. Burke’s theory of representative democracy was a reaction against this. He argued that members of Parliament should not simply be proxies for their constituents. It was a discussion about the relationship between MPs and their constituents, not MPs and their parties. On the relationship between a member of Parliament and his or her party—and that is the debate that is before us now—Burke was much more ready to concede that parliamentarians should be ready to submit to the collective will.

In conclusion, the practical experience of the last 4 years shows that the legislation works well, and that there has been a real improvement in the stability of Parliament, which is why the Government has agreed to support the introduction of this bill into the House to allow Parliament to decide whether it is an arrangement that should be reinstated permanently. I commend the bill to the House.

GERRY BROWNLEE (Deputy Leader—National) Link to this

That speech just delivered by the Hon Pete Hodgson in support of this bill, the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill, was written by those in the Beehive responsible for Government propaganda, because this bill has nothing to do with electoral integrity and everything to do with the Government being able to manage its numbers through as long a period as possible. I think it is extremely unfortunate that whoever wrote that speech should pervert the thinking of Edmund Burke in the way in which the Minister presented it. When Mr Burke spoke about the need for MPs to exercise their conscience and to be without any outside influence, because of the electoral system in Britain some 200 years ago, he was railing against outside influence on members of Parliament when they exercise their vote for their constituents. This bill puts that authority very directly outside the House. It empowers political parties to influence, from the administrative side, the law and its progress in this country.

We need to go back to the essence of our democracy and think back to just a couple of weeks ago when we were all returned to this House. At the Commission Opening we were required to come in and take the oath or affirmation, and none of us were called by our party group. None of us were called in a block according to our political allegiance. Every member was called simply in alphabetical order and sworn in as an individual member, because the principle inside a Parliament such as this is that every member sits here as a free and unencumbered individual. The choices any of us might make about belonging to a political party caucus are for us to make.

But this bill determines that the leader of any political party is the person who decides what any other one of us may or may not think, or how we may or may not vote inside this House. It is no longer a matter of choice. It is no longer a matter of a member representing his or her constituents by choosing to belong to a political party, and participating in that political party’s activity, because it is good for his or her constituents in his or her view; it is now a case of join up and be told what to do. If one does not like what one is told to do, then one is simply removed. The processes as outlined in this bill streamline those in previous legislation. They are much simpler, much clearer, and give much greater authority to party leaders.

One of the points that I think we need to understand is that this bill effectively destroys the integrity of members of Parliament. Members of Parliament choose to belong to a political party. They do that because their beliefs, their philosophies, and their integrity can be best expressed through that political party. It should not be a problem if someone decides that he or she does not agree with an aspect of that political party’s philosophy—or should I say if that person agrees with its philosophy and perhaps not its policy—for them to be able to express it by crossing the floor.

Tomorrow both the major parties will have split votes on a particular bill. Yet if the leader of either of those parties had determined otherwise, and this bill were in place, the consequences for members splitting their votes away from their political party could well be the termination of their time as parliamentarians. That is wrong, because surely part of the exercise of one’s political integrity is making sure that one votes only for things that one believes are good for one’s constituents.

It is very interesting that New Zealand First members are so keen to support this legislation. Yesterday there was a conference in this establishment run by Victoria University in which no less than three of New Zealand First members took part and they bagged their leader mercilessly for his performance in the election campaign. They, of course, are now trying to tell us that they are quite happy to come in here and shackle themselves totally to his views of how New Zealand First should present itself. That is what they will do. I think any one of them could easily be accused of completely ignoring the constituency that sent them here, by virtue of giving up their right to speak freely as members of Parliament.

I know how uncomfortable New Zealand First members were today when we pointed out that the leader of the New Zealand First Party—the man who said he did not want the trappings and baubles of office—managed to take a flight paid for by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from Malta to Glasgow and then across to Edinburgh so that he could instruct ministry officials to go cap in hand to the Scottish Rugby Union and demand that he was seated appropriately behind the All Black captain as he received the trophy for winning the grand slam. Mr Peters is a man who did not want any of the trappings of office, but is very quick to take them, and equally quick to shut his own members out of it.

That is the problem we get with bills such as this. It puts enormous amounts of authority in the hands of Winston Peters, in the hands of Helen Clark, even in the hands of Don Brash, and any other party leader who happens to hold sway in this House. I ask the question: why do we have a democratic process to put members in Parliament if, immediately, the franchise of that member of Parliament is constrained—and even removed, as I would suggest is the case with this bill—and handed to a political party leader?

The Minister over there said that one of the great things about MMP is that it has seen a diversity of views come into this House. Well, the reality is that that diversity is only going to be to the extent that any political party leader allows. So we will have the Green Party members all pretty much clones of their leader, the New Zealand First Party members almost clones of their leader, and we already know that the Labour Party members, of course, choose to be clones of Helen Clark—certainly devotees, anyway. That cannot be good for Parliament. That cannot be good for democracy in this country.

I ask the question also: if the party-hopping legislation worked so well in the last 4 years, why did we see the debacle over the Alliance breakdown, and the absolute disgrace of Mr Anderton sitting in the House as the parliamentary leader of the Alliance but outside Parliament being the leader of the Progressive Party? That sort of nonsense could well be replicated over and over by a bill such as this. So any suggestion that it tidies up this place and that it somehow makes things better is just plain wrong.

I know that in 1996, and in the subsequent years leading up to the New Zealand First breakdown, people such as Mr Woolerton wanted desperately to get away from the New Zealand First Party—wanted desperately to walk away. But because he was a man of integrity he chose not to. His reward for that choice—for that exercise of integrity—has been two further terms in this House. The public understands how these things work, and the public do not need the protection of a draconian bill like this, because it is one of those bills where the protection actually takes away significant rights.

The National Party will not be supporting this bill. We do not think this adds anything to democracy, and we know that the only point of its being on the programme today is, in fact, to give the Government a management tool to ensure that New Zealand First does not walk away from the extremely shonky relations and arrangements it has to be the Government.

TIM BARNETT (Labour—Christchurch Central) Link to this

I was privileged to chair the Justice and Electoral Committee back in 1999-2000, when the predecessor to this bill was referred to our select committee. We conducted a comprehensive public consultation on the bill, recommended it back to the House, and then it became law. So I think it is very appropriate that I should pass just a few comments in relation to what went on, and also on how the law has worked since then.

I freely admit that, as somebody who is an electorate member of Parliament and who, like all electorate MPs, gives priority to the issues in the electorate, I approached the predecessor to this bill with some caution back in 1999-2000. But the legal guarantees we got, and the working of the legislation since, has certainly proven to me that this has become another essential building block of what is the emergent New Zealand electoral system as represented in our Parliament.

I guess in relation to every piece of legislation one has to ask: where is the threat? In a Parliament as finely balanced as this one—a Parliament with eight parties represented, and with three of those parties having four, three, and two members, and another having one member—clearly a single change in a member of Parliament from one party to another can actually have a massive effect. I think this Parliament is a very good illustration of the wrong that this legislation seeks to right, because a move by one member of Parliament could have a profound effect on the whole balance in this Chamber. It is fascinating also that this legislation, which arose out of the issues in the 1996-99 Government and was treated with great care during the ending of the Alliance in Parliament towards 2002, was tested by ACT in the Donna Awatere Huata case, which went through to the Supreme Court. As a result, her departure from this House was confirmed.

At the end of the day, political balance is the essence of this legislation, and in order to make sure that it will be effective, processes are clearly laid out in it. Either the individual member of Parliament will write to the Speaker, effectively resigning from the House, or the parliamentary leader of the party will write, stating that the member is no longer effectively a member of the political party he or she belonged to when elected. That process has to be identified particularly carefully. It is laid down in the legislation that, firstly, the parliamentary leader has to believe that the member concerned has acted in a way that has distorted, and is likely to continue to distort, the proportionality of Parliament—that is, shows a pattern of voting against the political party—and, secondly, after consideration of the conduct of the member by the party he or she belonged to, two-thirds of the caucus has to agree that the member is no longer operating as a member of that party. That is necessarily an imprecise science, because we are talking about human behaviour in this most heated of environments.

Over time MMP develops, and in New Zealand, unlike other countries with an MMP system, we have not seen a rapid reduction in the number of parties elected to our Parliament. Therefore with the existence of small parties and with the existence of tight majorities, this kind of legislation has an importance. Indeed, our MMP system may be similar to that of other countries, with our unique factors at play here.

I commend this legislation to the House. I commend the ending of the time limitation, because over the last 6 years this legislation has proven to be one of the essential building blocks to make our electoral system work better.

Hon BILL ENGLISH (National—Clutha-Southland) Link to this

It is so disappointing that the Parliament finds itself again debating the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill. When Parliament passed the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act back in the first term of the current Government, I was relieved it had an expiry clause so this abomination on the Parliament would come to an end. It did, but we did not realise just how self-serving the new Government arrangements would be that have given rise to the agreement between Labour and New Zealand First to bring this Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill to the House.

I contend that this bill is a cynical use of power by the executive. In Parliament now we have this strange situation where the executive accords itself a wide-ranging flexibility for the arrangements that it makes in order to keep itself in power. So we have this innovative and entrepreneurial arrangement between Labour and Mr Peters—and Mr Dunne, to be fair—whereby they can function in quite an unprecedented way. They can be Ministers in the Government and Opposition in the Parliament. They have to follow collective responsibility in their portfolio areas but they are not bound by collective responsibility in any other area.

So the executive has kept to itself all the advantages of the flexibility of the New Zealand constitution. It is exploiting that flexibility, and it has some grand talk about what it is doing. It says that MMP is developing; that we are coming up with new conventions; let us just say that everyone agrees with the Government arrangement that has been put together. I certainly do not, and the National Party does not agree with that arrangement, because fundamentally it lacks integrity. But we accept that it will be put to the test by the pressures of government, and then it will be put to the test by the next election. However, that flexibility is something that Helen Clark and Winston Peters want to make very sure is not available to any member of this Parliament. So they want a set of rules for the executive that are endlessly flexible and totally open-ended, so they can make whatever arrangement they like to suit themselves, but they want to make absolutely sure that the representatives in the House—elected by the people—do not have it.

The executive is not elected by the people; it is elected either by the Labour Party caucus, in the case of the Labour Party, or selected by the leader in the case of the National Party. I am not quite sure how the Greens would do it; and I hesitate to even imagine it! The executive is not elected by the people, but the MPs are. That is what is so wrong with this legislation. The executive, unelected, has decided to make whatever rules it likes to suit itself, but those who were elected by the people—the MPs right through this Parliament—are going to be prevented from making what would be an extreme decision, and that is to leave their party and thereby disturb the proportionality of Parliament.

Let us just think about the consequences in this Parliament of different people making the sorts of decisions that this legislation is aimed at. If an MP leaves a party within the Opposition and stays in the Opposition, sure it does disturb the proportionality of Parliament, but it does not make any difference to the Government; it does not change any of the decisions that it is making. In this Parliament, with the arrangements that are in place, an MP can leave one of the governing parties—the New Zealand First Party, or United Future, or Labour—and cross to the Opposition and it does not make any difference to what is going to happen in the Parliament, under the current arrangements. So this bill will stop that from happening, whereas it does not make any difference.

Let us see what would make a difference. Say, for example, Mr Winston Peters decides to leave the Government. Well, that might bring it down, it might cause an election. Certainly, he will leave the Government; it is just a matter of time. That could bring the Government down and cause a change of Government, or cause an election—the two things can happen separately. But both are, from the point of view of voters, fairly drastic results. There are pretty important consequences from that.

Is Parliament going to pass any legislation that says: “Once you’ve signed a confidence agreement, you must keep it for the term of office.”? No, we are not, even though that is the measure that would make the biggest difference to the stability of government. Why do we not do it? We do not, because we believe that it is better that those arrangements are tested by the pressures of government, by the flow of public opinion, and by the scrutiny of Parliament and the media. We know that under those pressures, those arrangements generally fail. They did between 1996 and 1999 a couple of times, and in fact they did before 1996. They failed between 1999 and 2002, and I will come back to that. They did not fail in the last term of office, and Peter Dunne paid the price and he feels very sorry for himself, because of it. And they will fail this time, because it is Winston Peters.

Those arrangements do stand the test of political reality, and that is what should happen for MPs who leave their party. They should stand the test of the political reality of an election. What we do know is that any New Zealand MP who becomes an Independent loses. Those people are never seen again. That is pretty harsh punishment. They get dealt to.

The other point about this legislation is that if members want to get around it, they can. I can recall the absurdity of Jim Anderton sitting in the House, saying: “I am leader of the Alliance in the House and leader of the Progressives outside the House.” Do members know what is so cunning about this legislation? It is that only the leader of a party can get away with it, because he or she cannot put in the letter. The leader of a party can get away with it, and Jim Anderton did. So leaders of parties can get around this legislation. Is not that ironic? Helen Clark and Winston Peters, two party leaders who want to take every political advantage of flexibility of our constitution that they can in order to form a Government and maintain executive power, then present the Parliament with legislation that only party leaders can avoid the consequences of, because they do not put in the letter. We know this from the historical record, because Jim Anderton did it. He was the leader of one party in the House, and the leader of another party outside the House.

I notice Government members quoting the Supreme Court in support of this legislation. The Supreme Court made a decision in the context of the legislation that was on the books. It would be quite wrong to read Sir Kenneth Keith’s opinion as being supportive of the legislation. That is our job to decide. He had no choice but to render a judgment on it, and in the terms of the legislation he rendered a wise judgment. But it is not to support the legislation.

So that is what is wrong with this legislation. It gives privilege to the executive. It takes from MPs privileges the executive have kept, which is the ability to make their own decisions about their own destiny—as Winston Peters will, and we know that. Doug Woolerton knows that, too. The day will come. But Doug Woolerton cannot leave his party. Winston Peters can leave the Government for political reasons, but Doug Woolerton cannot leave his party. Is not that just ridiculous? This is stealing from the representatives of the people the fundamental, longstanding, and deeply held privileges of representation. That is what it did in the Government’s last term in office and it is to my great regret that this Government, the Government of New Zealand, has decided now to remove those privileges forever, because there is no wind-out clause in this legislation.

R DOUG WOOLERTON (NZ First) Link to this

New Zealand First has pleasure in supporting the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill. New Zealand First has had experience with people upsetting the balance of the Parliament by leaving our party and sitting with parties that opposed us. The electoral integrity legislation lapsed on election night, and it needs to be put back in place. It is all very well for Bill English and the National Party to talk about what they see as right. It is all very well for them to say that the legislation takes away rights from individual MPs. It does not. If a person stands up before the public and says he or she is standing for the New Zealand First Party and will represent what that party stands for, whether as a list MP or as a constituent MP, through the next 3 years, then that person should stay with that party.

In the case of a constituent MP, if that member disagrees to such an extent with the party, or if the views of the member’s electorate are at such divergence with the party’s views, that he or she sees fit to leave the party—

NANDOR TANCZOS (Green) Link to this

Like Mr English, I find it extraordinary to be rising to make a speech on a bill that seeks to reinstate the 2001 Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act. It is like a weird kind of purgatory where Parliament relives its worst legislative moments over and over again. It is like déjà vu or cheesy Christmas television. In fact, my greatest fear is that this whole session of Parliament descends into some kind of B movie rerun channel, with Mr Winston Peters playing Bela Lugosi. Because, of course, this is all about Winston Peters, and, of course, we can understand that. He must be terrified right now. He has been exported by the Government to charm parliamentarians and trade officials around the world—people whom just a few weeks ago he was calling Osamas and Ying-Tongs. The shamelessness of the man is quite extraordinary. So now he has been sent overseas by the Government, and he is the ultimate vacant feline, and while the cat is away it is clear that there is a little dissension among the rodents.

Mr Doug Woolerton is a man beloved by all the blokes in Parliament for his humour, but he is not known for making the grand dramatic gesture. Yet he could not stomach watching his leader clutching at the baubles of office despite his strong language to the contrary during the election campaign, and his resignation as party president must have been a severe shot up the arm for his boss.

Mr Woolerton said he disagreed with his leader many times in the past. The question is: how many times has he won? The latest media interest in the internal feedback on the New Zealand First election campaign is simply another indication of the subterranean rumblings in its caucus, which would be fine if Mr Peters had not lost the ultimate weapon for keeping his MPs in line. Up until now it has been his grip on Tauranga that has been the party’s guarantee of representation in Parliament. Party polling goes up and down for New Zealand First, but it has always been able to count on Tauranga—until now. His boss has lost his ultimate bludgeon, and the desperate court battle to wrench the electorate away from the man who won it—Bob Clarkson—simply confirms Mr Peters’ fear.

New Zealand First MPs can sniff freedom, and they like it. That is the context in which we must understand this bill. It is not so much a resurrection, as some kind of weird taxidermy, and it is something that the Government was so ashamed of in 1999 that it included a sunset clause to ensure that there was an end to its misery. It must be to its intense embarrassment that it has to return to that shame, to use the biblical phrase, like a dog to its own vomit, and all because Winston Peters is losing his grip. Part of the price of his support for the Government is this draconian piece of legislation to lock in his power and return to his arm the ability to make the king hit in his caucus. This bill epitomises the anti-democratic processes within New Zealand First. We know that the election campaign, political strategy, direction, list-ranking process, and even speaking slots and times are decided by Mr Peters in consultation with his mirror. If members doubt the truth of that, they should just recall the beginning of the last term of Parliament when all the New Zealand First MPs had their maiden speeches cut short because Mr Peters wanted more time for himself.

Well, with this bill Mr Peters will have the ability to expel elected but independent-minded MPs not just from his own caucus but from the Parliament itself. While some members may say that such a creature would be rare to find in the New Zealand First caucus due to the rigorous selection process I have already alluded to, I must say that this is a serious concern for all members of Parliament and our right of free speech.

Let us look at the bill. Clause 4 inserts, among other new sections, new section 55A, “Member ceasing to be parliamentary member of political party”, if, as new subsection (3)(b) states, “the parliamentary leader of the political party for which the member of Parliament was elected delivers to the Speaker a written notice”. That written notice must, according to new section 55D(a), “state that the parliamentary leader reasonably believes that the member of Parliament concerned has acted in a way that has distorted, and is likely to continue to distort, the proportionality of political party representation in Parliament as determined at the last general election;”.

Well, what does that actually mean? If a party leader were to act in a way that was contrary to his or her promises to the electorate, and/or contrary to the party’s policy—I am talking here about a party where policy is determined by the membership, not by sticking a wet finger in the air—then an independent-minded MP of that party could challenge the leader over his or her dishonesty, in which case the leader could simply refuse to renew the party membership of that member. That would be a sufficient basis to argue that the member concerned had distorted the proportionality of Parliament even if he or she continued to vote largely with the party he or she had been a member of.

Mr Woolerton said that we must respect the party and the policies, and that is exactly my point—this bill does exactly the opposite. That is not entirely hypothetical, because that is more or less what happened with the ACT party and Donna Awatere Huata. While the ACT members’ decision may have been motivated by embarrassment at the allegations being made against her, rather than embarrassment at criticism of their party leader, the legislation does not, and is absolutely incapable of, making a distinction based on motivation.

Supporters of the bill will argue that there is a safeguard because the leader must also reassure the Speaker that two-thirds of the caucus support the notice, but that is not very much comfort at all when the list selection process for the next election remains primarily in the hands of the party leader. If the caucus wants to oppose its leader in making such a notice, it had better be prepared to roll the leader at the same time.

As an aside, for Mr English’s edification, the Green Party list-ranking process is, as far as I am aware, the only democratic list-ranking process of any political party in this country. Every member of our party gets an equal vote over the final list position, and I do not think there is another party in this House that can make a claim even remotely close to that.

This Parliament has heard all these arguments before, as has the public almost 6 years ago, back in 1999, when the chaos of the first MMP Parliament was still fresh in people’s minds. I am hoping that Tau Henare does make a contribution to this debate, because I think he would have a useful perspective for us.

This House debated the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill, and, if one goes back to the newspaper reports of the time, one can see that it is quite interesting reading. The New Zealand Herald, in November of that year, summed up the argument well when it stated that Labour and the Alliance “… ought to be careful about changing an important constitutional convention … The disgust is symptomatic of failures deeper than party-switching and requires solutions more sophisticated than an oppressive parliamentary rule.” It goes on to state: “Who owns a political party—its parliamentary leaders, its executive council? Jim Anderton did not believe so when he left Labour and remained in Parliament proclaiming that he alone was true to the party’s principles. Voters are the best judge of MPs who follow that course. It would be infinitely wiser to leave it to them.” Of course, it makes us bear in mind that that bill was in response to the Alliance’s need to shore up its independent-minded MPs, just as this bill today is about New Zealand First doing the same thing.

The message of that New Zealand Herald editorial is exactly the point. That is the message. In the words of my Green colleague Metiria Turei, who said, when challenging Mr Peters’ assertion that he had the support of all the parties of this House in passing this bill: “The Greens have long argued that the voters, and only the voters, should decide whether an MP has left their party for the right or the wrong reasons. Political parties must not be allowed to take away from voters the power to unelect members of Parliament.” If Winston Peters wants the State to give legal power to his authority over his MPs, the Greens will not help him.

Dr PITA SHARPLES (Co-Leader—Māori Party) Link to this

This bill is essentially to preserve the position of the minority Labour-led Government. This Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill lacks integrity. This bill is based on fear. It is a glue to hold together a very shaky coalition relationship. It is a prop to assist very different party philosophies to stay together. It is a device to prevent the Government coalition from imploding.

Coming back to integrity—or the lack of it—I say that the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill seems to be part of the deal that New Zealand First struck with those who were desperate to hold on to power so that they might exercise this power in any way they saw fit. The Māori Party, on the other hand, was created on the basis of integrity. Our co-leader Tariana Turia showed integrity when she walked away from those who had lost it. The Māori Party does not see the need for such a bill. Since the inception of the Māori Party we have declared that—regardless of what people may think of us—we will, as parliamentarians in this House and, indeed, as citizens of our country, always act with integrity.

We have spent some time discussing this bill, and, although we initially supported the concept, we realised that integrity could not be legislated for. The Māori Party questions the need for a bill that has been designed to enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system. Our party is driven by kaupapa, one of which is integrity. Even if this bill is passed into law, we do not believe that we would ever have occasion to use it. We do not need the gorilla of laws to frighten or threaten us in order to guide our behaviour. Ours is not a party that uses fear, intimidation, or bullying as a means of achieving discipline. Discipline must come from within.

We also ask why it is necessary to enhance the maintenance of political party proportional representation in Parliament. Should not the real litmus test—the integrity of parliamentarians—be evident to all through the performance in this very House, the performance on the streets, the performance of politicians walking the talk, the performance of parliamentarians taking Parliament to the people?

We believe in the power of kōrero, whakawhiti, and hūmārie. We believe in reconciliation and restorative processes, and we believe in our ability to arrive at consensus without rancour and bitter divisiveness. We will talk with anyone, and we have demonstrated that in our short time as a party in this House. Talking with people does not mean selling one’s soul or selling out to one’s people. Although we are new in this House, we will never ever sell out on our people. Talking brings understanding and informed decision-making.

There will be opportunities for difference, and this is one party that celebrates difference. We have neither central control nor rigid, hierarchical control. Our process of reaching decisions is through consensus. It is a kaupapa Māori solution. It was laid down by our national executive and accepted by our 21,000 members. In that respect, we have come from a culture that has never had to use the law to achieve integrity.

Is not our greatest possibility to enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system evident through the challenges we set before ourselves? They are personal standards that are acted out in a political arena. There are members in this House, like Ross Robertson, Nandor Tanczos, Sue Kedgley, and, of course, we in the Māori Party, who are extremely keen on establishing a code of conduct for use in this House. A code of conduct would include not using race or ethnicity as political footballs. That is something I referred to in my maiden speech, and seems commonplace in this House. The public of this country want integrity in this House to mean standards of behaviour—appropriate codes of decorum—not subservience to a party line. Blind loyalty to party allegiances is the King Kong factor breathing over us. We should instead be reflecting how our party philosophy directs us to act, not acting in fear because a gorilla might drop in on us. The Māori Party has come into Parliament to stand up and be counted for the things that matter. We will uphold integrity as being of the highest value in our behaviour and our processes in this House. This is of our own making.

We note that New Zealand First will be supporting the Labour Government sponsored Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill because, as its leader has stated, it is a positive step in ensuring stability. This is perhaps an admission, or a confession, by New Zealand First that it lacks the discipline—in fact, the stability—to ensure that this marriage to Labour will be of at least 3 years’ duration.

The title of this bill has the word “integrity” in brackets. We want to bring the concept of integrity out of the brackets and back into Parliament. We do not believe that the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill will do this. It is for this reason that we do not support this bill.

NANDOR TANCZOS (Green) Link to this

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. During my speech I indicated that the Green Party was the only party with a democratic list selection process. I want to correct the record, because I understand that the Māori Party also has such a process.

SIMON POWER (National—Rangitikei) Link to this

At 1 minute to 6 it is my pleasure to rise and make a contribution in opposition to the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill.

Parliament knows that legislation is poor legislation when the original version of that legislation contained a sunset clause. No enduring, well-thought-out, or far-sighted legislation contains a sunset clause, and I know that many Labour members are deeply embarrassed about the fact that this legislation has found its way back on to the Order Paper.

Hon PETER DUNNE (Leader—United Future) Link to this

I do cherish democracy. I believe it is one of the most precious things we have at the core of our society, and I believe that one of the traditions of democracy that we cannot afford to do away with is that it is an effective representation of the public will. For that reason, I and my party will vote for the introduction of this legislation and its referral to a select committee.

The issues addressed in this bill need to be thoroughly examined. I say that for a number of reasons. Mr Power alluded to my attachment to the republic of China—Taiwan—as an instance of support for democracy.I thought he was going to allude to the fact that I have been through some changes in my own political career that relate to the provisions of this bill. I know what it is like to leave a party, to go out on one’s own, and to build a new party as a consequence. I know the challenges that emerge when the public who vote for one try to work out what all the implications of the changes have been for them.

It is important that members of Parliament who are elected to represent constituencies have the unfettered right to express their views, their aspirations, and the concerns of their constituents to this Parliament without fear or favour. I have long felt that one of the deficiencies in this legislation as it was previously, was that it did not make a distinction between electorate members of Parliament, who draw their strength from the support of voters, and party list members, who come in essentially—and I say this with no disrespect to colleagues on the list from all sides of the House—because of the support they receive from their parties. I think that one of the issues the select committee ought to consider is whether, in fact, there should be a distinction in law between the two.

I think that the reason for passing this legislation in 2000, based around the instability of the transitional period to MMP, can be argued further. But it is unarguable that in the last 6 years there has not been the degree of inter-party movement that occurred in the 6 years previous. The question is whether that is because the system has settled down or because of the existence of this legislation. That is something the select committee ought to examine because, quite frankly, we do not have a definitive judgment on that point. I think also that the one occasion this legislation was implemented during the previous Parliament showed up a number of deficiencies that will need to be examined by the select committee. I find it ironic that the party that perhaps campaigned most actively against the legislation was the only party to have implemented it so far, but I do not hold that against it.

RODNEY HIDE (Leader—ACT) Link to this

On behalf of the ACT party, I rise to oppose this legislation as inherently anti-democratic and anti the rights and privileges—

DIANNE YATES (Labour) Link to this

I think it is time to remind people what this bill is about. It amends the Electoral Act 1993 in order to enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system. It is also designed to enhance the maintenance of the proportionality of political party representation in Parliament, as determined—if we are talking about democracy—by the electors. The bill reinstates the operative provisions of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001, which expired at the close of 17 September 2005. The Government believes that these provisions are a useful part of New Zealand’s constitutional framework.

This is an anti - waka-jumping bill. When I came into Parliament, I said to myself that if ever I strongly disagreed with my party, I hoped I would have the moral integrity to resign and stand again, if that were the case. That is what this bill enshrines. A member of the party that has used the electoral integrity legislation was speaking against it a few minutes ago. That, to me, means that that person cannot be trusted. This bill ensures that parliamentarians who are voted in by their electors, and who are standing for parties, whether on the list or for a seat, should not be waka jumpers. If MPs do not like the stand on which they came into Parliament, and if they disagree with party policy, then they should have the personal integrity to resign and stand again. It seems that we have to have this Act of Parliament in order to teach people what integrity is, what trust is, and what the electors want.

Dr RICHARD WORTH (National) Link to this

The Electoral (Integrity) Amendment bill is a short bill, for all practical purposes. Apart from the sunset clause, upon which others have spoken, it is identical to the Act that preceded it, which, as the previous speaker just said, expired at the close of 17 September 2005.

National opposes the bill, just as it opposed the Act. It does so against a background of having seen the workings of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 in operation. I welcome the reservations expressed by the Hon Peter Dunne, and the comments made by the previous speaker, Dianne Yates, that, certainly on one view of it, would seem to be quite hostile to the continuation of this type of legislation.

The bill on its face—and I am referring to clause 3—asserts a purpose to “(a) enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system;”, and those are lofty constitutional words. I guess they recall the words of Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol.