Hon ANNETTE KING (Acting Minister of Trade) Link to this
I move, That the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill be now read a second time. I begin by thanking the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee for its consideration of the bill and for reporting the bill back to the House with the recommendation that it be passed with no amendments.
The select committee also conducted an international treaty examination of the Free Trade Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. It is clear that the select committee has carefully considered the views of submitters. The report reflects the strong support in this House and in the wider business community for the free-trade agreement, and it also reflects alternative views. The select committee sees the agreement as being a major event in New Zealand’s history, and as being fundamental to the future economic well-being of this country. Among the main benefits that the select committee highlights are the increased access for New Zealand trade and investment, the frameworks established for resolving issues in the future, the support to New Zealand’s objective of broadening and deepening relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and the support to New Zealand’s wider trade policy interests in strengthening economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region and multilaterally. The select committee notes that the agreement will bring considerable value to New Zealand and to our economy.
The agreement is China’s first free-trade agreement with an OECD member country. Being the first developed country to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with China gives New Zealand a time for unique competitive advantage. It raises New Zealand’s profile in China. Chinese tariffs on New Zealand products cost exporters almost $120 million each year. The agreement will remove tariffs on 96 percent of New Zealand’s current exports to China. The removal of these tariffs will deliver significant gains for our exporters. I acknowledge the select committee’s view that the removal of the remaining New Zealand tariffs on Chinese imports will be done in such a way as to allow New Zealand industry time to adapt. The removal of Chinese tariffs under the agreement will result in a far greater increase in New Zealand’s exports to China than in Chinese exports to New Zealand, in significant part because Chinese tariff levels are currently higher than those of New Zealand.
In addition to reducing barriers to our trade with China, the agreement promotes cooperation in a broad range of areas, including intellectual property, which was identified as an important area by submitters. It provides a platform for further engagement at governmental, cultural, and people-to-people levels. There are safeguards to ensure the New Zealand Government retains the right to reasonably regulate in the interest of public welfare, including to protect public health, safety, and the environment. As the select committee notes, investment is likely to become an important aspect of the China - New Zealand relationship. The legally binding agreements on labour and the environment will enhance communication and cooperation on those issues and, we believe, help towards achieving the objectives of raising working standards and improving environmental protection in both countries.
The select committee notes concerns raised by a number of submitters on human rights. Experience shows that engagement with countries speeds up the process of reform and change, but that isolation slows down that process. I share the select committee’s hope that New Zealand’s closer relationship with China, as a result of this agreement, will make a small but positive indirect contribution to China’s reform in that area.
The bill amends New Zealand’s domestic legislation so that the agreement can be brought into force.
In conclusion, I say the agreement is important for New Zealand as a trading nation. It will give us access to a vast market for our goods, services, and investment. The accompanying agreement on labour and the environment will encourage cooperation in those areas. The bill’s passage will be one of the final steps in a long process of bringing the agreement into being. I commend this bill to the House.
TIM GROSER (National) Link to this
The National Party strongly supports the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill. As members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, my colleagues and I listened very carefully to the submitters during the select committee process. There is an understandable tendency on any of these trade issues, in a numerical sense, for a majority of submitters to have concerns about these agreements. Often these concerns are based on longstanding objections to trade agreements per se, or on a view of the political relationship—and I will try to come to that presently. But the major thrust of the submissions from major New Zealand institutions that took the time and trouble to make submissions was overwhelmingly supportive of this agreement, and very much consistent with the views of the two major parties. I want to use my brief time here to focus on what I think is the reason for that. It is the bigger picture rather than the minutiae that I think New Zealanders should have in their heads as they consider the passage of this bill.
One of the interesting factoids about globalisation for me is that around the world we have already achieved an extraordinary degree of political unity. Roughly half the people in the world are governed by two capitals, New Delhi and China, and the other half are governed by 190 different Governments, including our own, of course. The implication of this is very important for New Zealand. It means that if we can, to use the vernacular, tie up access into just two capitals—if we can come to an accommodation with Beijing and New Delhi—New Zealand, this tiny country of 4 million people, will essentially have access to half the consumers in the world. That is an amazing factoid to contemplate. With the passage of this bill, we in New Zealand will be in a position to put in place the first piece in that jigsaw puzzle.
As members will be aware, the very preliminary steps have been taken in respect of the other great developing capital, New Delhi, to try to get a similar agreement—it will take a number of years, and it will be extremely difficult—with India. Even now, with this Chinese free-trade agreement, we have already achieved a historic result for this country. I am not suggesting, by any means, that I am the only New Zealander who has been involved in this; in the last 35 years generations of New Zealanders have been involved in this fight for access. No developed country in the world has had its economic prospects so tightly constrained by a lack of access for its principal exports than New Zealand. It has been one enormous struggle for generations of New Zealanders—farming leaders, trade Ministers, Prime Ministers, trade negotiators like myself—to try to find a way to open opportunities for New Zealand.
This has been the story of New Zealand in terms of our external trading regime since 1973, when we lost access to the United Kingdom. Historically, the United Kingdom had set up a great deal of its farming systems 15,000 kilometres away in New Zealand, to furnish the food needs of its consumers. It then entered into what was then a viciously protective system known as the common agricultural policy, a system that has been enormously transformed for the better, may I say, in the last 15 years. That system was a dagger pointed at the heart of our economy, and it has taken 30 years of enormous struggle to deal with the implications of this.
When we think about that and then put this bill alongside, we see that this is a watershed event for New Zealand in terms of our long-term economic prospects. In 30 years we have gone from a situation where we have had to fight for every kilogram of access for our highly competitive and wonderful food and beverages to a situation where we are essentially getting, within a decade, free access to the world’s second emerging economic superpower. That is the big picture. That is the picture that I hope New Zealanders keep in their minds as they listen to the criticism, some of which has some legitimacy here and there, but the big picture is that picture.
Access to markets has been the fundamental problem, and this free-trade agreement provides a huge qualitative shift for the better for New Zealand. It is not the whole answer, and I would like to take this opportunity to wish the New Zealand team in Geneva well in the next crucial 4 or 5 days. Obviously, I know them extremely well, having chaired the agriculture negotiations prior to entering politics, and I know how difficult it will be. They have the skills, I have no doubt about that, but they will need luck, as well, to pull this together.
The World Trade Organization system is about the international glue that surrounds these free-trade areas. It is the only way we can accomplish disciplines on either export subsidies or production subsidies, and on certain other trade issues of considerable importance to New Zealand. But these free-trade agreements, of which this is really the jewel in the crown now for New Zealand, are about one aspect of this, the market aspect, which does not require forward progress in Geneva to celebrate today.
When we look at China, I think we have to bear in mind that this is a market that will probably become New Zealand’s largest single export market—I would say for it to happen within 5 years is quite possible. For those who think that that is far-fetched, I say they should reflect on the fact that China, according to preliminary estimates of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, has already—incredibly—passed Japan as Australia’s largest market. Sure, Australia has giant mineral exports that have fuelled that, but I believe that New Zealand’s agricultural future will also fuel the future growth of our exports. I see no reason why the current average growth rate of 11 percent—that is, the compound average growth rate of New Zealand exports to China over the last 3 years—should not be maintained at or near those levels for some time to come. And the reason is the very success of the Chinese in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. As they have moved out of poverty, 34 percent of the Chinese population is now in that crucial $1 to $2-a-day bracket. Broadly speaking, agricultural economists would argue that at $1 to $2 a day, people are struggling to put two very basic meals on the table. Maybe they can afford some primary school fees for their kids; probably not.
It is in the next income bracket, of above $2 a day, that we will see in the next 20 years further massive growth in the number of these people, as hundreds of millions of Chinese move out from that $1 to $2-a-day bracket into the $2 to $10-a-day bracket. It is precisely in those income brackets that we will then see significant increases in the consumption of meats of all types, dairy products, fruits, vegetables, and edible oils. They are products that are really off limits for people in the $1 to $2-a-day bracket. So quite apart from celebrating, as we would, the transformation of people’s lives in terms of their being pulled out of poverty, this is fundamentally positive news for New Zealand, and I think it will underwrite this country’s export growth over the next 20 years.
So that, if you like, is the bigger picture. In my remaining minute or two I just want to concentrate on the legitimate concerns that people have raised on human rights and give my own perspective, which I think is the predominant view of the committee, although I will use my own words. It is probably unwise, when we talk about human rights, to try to categorise things in relative terms. It is a bit like theologians arguing whether there is such a thing as relative sin. It is better to stay off that ground. One could make a case that when 26 million people were estimated to have died during the Cultural Revolution, there has been a very considerable improvement in human rights. But, of course, individual events still occur. I think that by opening up to China we can make a very limited, but necessarily positive, contribution.
MARTIN GALLAGHER (Labour—Hamilton West) Link to this
As the chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, it obviously gives me great pleasure to comment on our report back, and to acknowledge the previous two speakers. Along with my colleague the deputy chair of the committee, Dr Wayne Mapp, I take this opportunity to thank all the members of the committee for their very hard work. In particular I acknowledge Tim Groser’s contribution. In my view he has given a very thought-provoking and comprehensive contribution to the House this afternoon. In terms of the writing of the report and some of the research, in some of his work—and I am sure Dr Mapp will agree with me—he gave a very, very good contribution, obviously acknowledging his own experience and the role he has played for this country over a number of years.
As we are a very broadly based committee, I also acknowledge—notwithstanding that he is the author of a minority report—our Green Party member, Keith Locke. He made a very good contribution and obviously, in terms of this democratic Parliament, this democratic House of Representatives, this afternoon, he will clearly in his contribution give alternatives—give voice to some alternative viewpoints—which of course the committee heard.
I acknowledge that a number of people had significant misgivings about this agreement. I certainly acknowledge the very comprehensive contribution of Dr Jane Kelsey, just to name but one. On the other hand, I acknowledge the very favourable responses that have been made publicly and through the committee, including one from the chairman of Fonterra, Henry van der Heyden: “This is a good, positive step for New Zealand and a good, positive step for dairying, so it has got to be good for Fonterra.”, and also I think good for New Zealand. In that context, I think the previous speaker alluded to the growing numbers of the middle class in China, in terms of their consumption. Of course, members can guess what products they will increasingly be consuming, as the per capita income in a whole section of Chinese society goes up.
In terms of the cross-section of Māoridom, I also acknowledge a public comment by Ngāi Tahu general manager, Geoff Hipkins, who stated that the tribe’s fishing arm exports more than $100 million worth of live lobsters to China annually, and also takes a large amount of pāua product. He said that in a country with 1.3 billion people, the deal has “amazing potential. The sky’s the limit really. To me, it’s a land of opportunity.” Zespri chairman Craig Greenlees made again what was a public comment, not necessarily in evidence to the committee, but it certainly reinforces some of the submissions we had to the committee: “China’s agreement to reduce the 20 percent tariff on kiwifruit to zero over the course of the next nine years is a very significant achievement—one that will be worth many millions of dollars to the New Zealand kiwifruit industry over time.”
Meat and Wool New Zealand chairman Mike Petersen said: “This is a good outcome for New Zealand sheep and beef farmers as it will immediately provide preferential access for New Zealand meat products in China compared to our competitors, plus it will let us build on the current trade.” Seafood Industry Council general manager of trade, Alistair McFarlane, said in a public quote: “China has become an important provider of seafood processing services to New Zealand seafood companies. Overall, it’s definitely good news.” I will give a final quote, in terms of quoting from prominent people in the business community. Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe said: “Having spent the last three days here with leaders from across the New Zealand business community the resounding feedback I’ve had was that people were thrilled with the opportunities created by this deal.”
As a member of Parliament I commend the leadership of the Prime Minister, and of the Minister of Trade—overseas trade—the Hon Phil Goff. Again, I do not think we should underestimate the huge opportunities that this particular agreement, in potential, has for New Zealand, notwithstanding the fact that there will be challenges for us, as well, in this context.
To conclude, I will quote a couple of paragraphs from the select committee report. Obviously, I and others will have an opportunity to make a further contribution during the Committee of the whole House and in the third reading, and I certainly anticipate doing so in some detail. I urge members of Parliament to read the select committee’s report back to the House, although I am sure they have already done so, because obviously they would not be sitting here participating in this debate if they had not. The document is for public circulation and is available on the web. I urge people to read it.
I think the select committee has given a very comprehensive report and obviously it has acknowledged a minority viewpoint, as well: “We have considered the alternative views submitted to us and concluded that the China-New Zealand FTA is of long-term strategic benefit to New Zealand. Lifting New Zealand’s export performance is among the most important economic objectives facing the country. New Zealand has historically suffered more than any other developed country from lack of assured access to markets for our traditional primary-based exports, because of severe agriculture market access barriers and subsidisation. China is the second emerging economic super-power, and within four to five decades may become the largest consumer market in the world. Through this FTA, China has essentially offered New Zealand the opportunity of all but free access for our goods exports in around a decade. As the recent Fonterra commercial announcement shows, substantial benefits have started to flow immediately, as companies in both countries anticipate the provisions of the agreement coming into force.”
I further quote from the committee’s report: “This is a historic opportunity for New Zealand and should be taken without equivocation. It also demands a coordinated response from New Zealand Inc. to fully exploit the advantages of the agreement, but such an examination was outside the scope of our inquiry.” I have nothing further to add at this point, except to thank members of the committee, to thank all the submitters, irrespective of their views, to acknowledge that there was a cross-section of views, and to say that we report back both the New Zealand - China Free Trade Agreement Bill and the free-trade agreement itself between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the majority of the committee supports the progress of this bill. Thank you, Mr Assistant Speaker.
Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) Link to this
This week Parliament will pass into law the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill, and that will be an important strategic gain for our country. It will, in fact, trigger the first round of tariff reductions on 1 October, and that is why it is a priority to get the legislation passed into law. Traders are waiting for us to do our legislative work so they can get ahead and reap the gains of the agreement. As the chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Mr Gallagher, noted in quoting the concluding comments of the committee’s report, this is a historic opportunity for New Zealand, and it is one that we as a nation must take.
Those parties that are voting against the bill, however well intentioned they might be, really are looking past New Zealand’s opportunities. Could they seriously suggest there could be a free-trade agreement better than this one? The New Zealand First Party, for instance, says that, yes, obviously there could be a better free-trade agreement, and, indeed, if there had been a better one—that is, faster liberalisation—I guess it would have supported it. Is that the case with either the Māori Party or the Green Party? I would think not. Based on what I hear, those parties are essentially against free trade. But I want to ask one of those three parties—the one that said that under appropriate conditions it would support such an agreement—whether it could actually imagine a country the size of China negotiating a free-trade agreement that would go from the current level of tariffs to no tariffs at all in just over 10 years. That party is simply quibbling about a year or two, surely, and that is not a good reason to vote against the bill.
One of the ironies of sitting in this House was demonstrated today when, during question time and before this debate, we heard all the New Zealand First members extolling through their questions the wonderful virtues of their leader, saying what a marvellous Minister of Foreign Affairs he had been for the country, and the Prime Minister agreeing—although one would have to say somewhat reluctantly—with those comments. Perhaps she felt she had no choice but to do so. But if their leader is such a marvellous Minister of Foreign Affairs for our country and if he is advancing our nation’s interests at every possible turn, then surely he should be doing the one decent thing he could do at this point in time—that is, to actually persuade his party to vote for this bill. We all know that it is in fact just naked political calculation on their part that apparently has them voting against this bill.
Let us be clear about this. This is an enormous strategic opportunity not just for New Zealand but also—as that country sees it—for China as well. We are talking about the second-largest trading nation in the world—not the second-largest economy in the world, but certainly the second-largest trading nation in the world—deciding that it would go for a full free-trade agreement on all goods, with no exceptions. There might be a delay of 1 year in one sector, but within 10 years there will be complete free trade across all sectors. China knows full well that every other country in the Asia-Pacific region knows that it has done that. In fact, Australia is negotiating with China as we speak and will also be getting, I assume, a full, total free-trade agreement. Members should think of the significance of that in the Asia-Pacific region, because we are talking about other countries that really struggle with that concept—countries like Japan, Korea, and also the United States when it comes to agricultural products.
This agreement will put real pressure on those economies to actually ante-up and shift their game. We have already seen that in relation to Japan. Can anyone seriously think that Japan would be in full free-trade agreement negotiations with New Zealand if it were not for this agreement? The Japanese know full well that this agreement puts the acid on them to shift deeply held views in relation to agriculture. Japan of all countries, along with Korea, has been extraordinarily obdurate in relation to freeing up agricultural trade. It wants to protect its farmers, who are grossly inefficient, at all costs. It knows that that day is coming to an end. It knows it will have to talk to those people and take them along a path of opening up their trade to a much wider approach. In truth, this agreement will end up being the precursor of full free trade within the Asia-Pacific region. It might take a bit more than 10 years—realistically it will probably take 20 or even 30 years—but it will have started with this agreement. China in particular knew what it was doing by going into these negotiations with New Zealand at this time. This is China’s attempt, I guess, not only to gain a further economic leverage within the Asia-Pacific region but also to boost its own prosperity by increasing trade within the region.
One of the remarkable things about the submissions was seeing who was in favour of the agreement. I am saying this directly to the Māori Party, which was not actually present during the submissions in the select committee. I am not suggesting it was deliberately absent, but because it does not have representatives on the committee it simply did not have the opportunity. So I think it is quite important for the committee members to report to the Māori Party that the leading Māori business organisations—the Federation of Māori Authorities and all the leading fishing companies—universally said they needed this agreement. Probably of all the business organisations they were the most strongly represented by their submissions. The mainstream—for want of a better term—business organisations saw this as a kind of pro forma exercise and tended to just let Parliament get on with it.
The Māori business organisations were making a very specific point here, however. It seemed to me that they were signalling two things. The first was that they were interested in an international engagement and that they had stepped out of their usual pattern of being passive recipients of Federated Farmers, the meat companies, the fishing companies, and so forth to being active traders in their own right rather than through intermediaries in the international arena.
The second point, which is perhaps more interesting, is that those Māori organisations saw that China, because it is a new economy and an emerging international trade partner, would provide special opportunities to Māori businesses to get ahead, to get a foot in, because they would kind of understand each other—both coming to a resurgence in recent times. So there would be empathy, sympathy, and a gain in trade. That was a hugely significant point, and I would suggest that the Māori Party needs to talk to a wider range of its own supporters to understand that this is actually a very strongly supported agreement because of the opportunities it provides for iwi-based organisations.
I would have to say to those submitters opposed to the agreement that they were running the autarchic ideas—well-intentioned though they might have been—that have been run in this country from the 1930s through to the 1950s, 1960s, and even the 1970s. Those days are gone. It is about as relevant as assembling railway wagons and trains in New Zealand. The truth is that we have to get to a situation where we have free trade, and where we find our points of international competitiveness. The Māori community has done precisely that by their submissions. Many other submitters saw this.
National is very pleased to support this agreement. We see it as a historic and unique opportunity for this country to get ahead. The single biggest challenge facing this country over the next decade is how to get back up the OECD ladder instead of—as we have done over the last 9 years—going down it. It may have taken 9 years for Labour to get to this point, but it seems to have finally realised that this country needs to get ahead. However, I suspect it will not have time to convince the voters of that.
R DOUG WOOLERTON (NZ First) Link to this
New Zealand First opposes the New Zealand - China free-trade agreement, and we do so with some sadness. We talked about this in the first reading of the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill. New Zealand First opposes free-trade deals with low-wage economies, because in a deal with a low-wage economy the deal is always in the best interest of the economy with the low wages—never the other way around. That has been proven in several other free-trade deals we have had—one deal was with Singapore—and it will be proven in this case. As I said, we talked about these concerns in the first reading of this bill, and we are now seeing the beginnings of newspaper articles where other people in the community find that the deficiencies in the free-trade agreement with China are becoming apparent—they are causing them concerns. I have an Independent article of 10 July of this year, which is only a wee while ago, where Tourism Holdings, Fletcher Building, and even Fonterra pointed out some of the dangers of the free-trade agreement with China to employment in this country and to the well-being of our businesses.
In the case of New Zealand, everybody here knows that we removed tariffs years ago and we have gone on OK. There was a lot of pain in that period, but we have got over that and, as Mr Groser was saying, we have spent 30 years looking for other markets. But I will point out that under the free-trade agreement with China—and Dr Mapp mentioned that we are arguing over a few years—it could be as late as 2019 before tariffs are reduced to nil on milk powders and produce like that. I remind people who say that that is of no consequence that produce like that is 20-odd percent of our exports right there—from the dairy industry—yet it will be 2019 before tariffs finally come off those products. Even then, there is a claw-back clause that allows China, if the deal causes too much trouble to China or if it impacts on its industry in any way, to push that date out even further. So I do not think the agreement is anything to get too excited about.
This article of 10 July is headed up “Hidden hooks emerge in China FTA”. A professor at Victoria University, Roger Bowden, says that it could be a problem for local tourism if the Chinese choose to take the advantage they are given under this free-trade deal to its greatest extent. He says people can virtually organise their tours to New Zealand from China, operating through Chinese companies with Chinese guides, and New Zealand merely provides the platform for them to drive through. We have talked about those things in the first reading of this bill, and we are talking about them now.
I have also talked about other issues in debates that we have had in this House, when I have said that China clearly does not intend to pay world prices for our products. Admittedly, China is opening up its economy, but that is because it has to. It will not be free-trade agreements that put us into China; it will be because we produce the best goods at the best prices for world markets. I am surprised that a so-called free-market party like the National Party says we need these sorts of agreements in order to get into China. We do not. We are getting into China because of the value of the produce that we make, in the same way as we are getting into all of the other markets around the world.
I have said, and I will say this again—and it will happen—that ultimately China will look to this country, just as England did, as a producer of those things it does not want to produce itself. So the Chinese will lease or buy farms in this country—they are already buying dairy factories and other plants—because it is cheaper for them to vertically integrate what they need by buying land here, in Australia, and in South America. They buy a plant and run the product through it, thus getting the product at a better price in their own country. We do not blame the Chinese for doing that; we understand why they would want to do that. But we cannot understand why politicians in this country do not support New Zealanders. We are hearing here all about why this agreement will be wonderful for China; I am not hearing about absolute cases that show why this agreement will be wonderful for New Zealanders. Will this agreement put up New Zealand wages? Will it help with regard to salaries in New Zealand? No, it will not.
No, it is not, and I will challenge the National Party—or the Labour Party, for that matter—to show me where that will happen.
We will not put product into China if it is not at the best price, we will not put product into China if it is not of the best quality, and we will not put product into China if China does not want it. The only reason—
You are right. It has nothing to do with the agreement, because the agreement means nothing. The Chinese are taking our product because they need it. They are taking our product because they are short of water, and they are taking our product because they need it. They are not taking it because of the free-trade agreement. In fact, the free-trade agreement makes sure that they will not lower their tariffs on many of the products that we produce for many years into the future.
We also know, as does every other parliamentarian here, that China is making a big move into the South Pacific. The Chinese are making their presence known there and are spreading their largesse throughout the region, providing courthouses and whatever facilities those countries want—and I say “Good on them.” But China is not doing that for the Pacific Islanders’ benefit either; China is doing that in order to spread its influence. We do not blame China for doing that, but let us not be totally naive when it comes to this free-trade agreement. Let us not be blinded by the numbers we see in China. Let us not be blinded by the numbers we see in India, where we are also negotiating a free-trade agreement. The money for our products—which are at the top end, by anybody’s language—is still in America and Europe, and will be there for many years into the future.
Sadly, because New Zealanders are not going to be advantaged by this bill to the degree they think they are, New Zealand First will have to vote against it.
KEITH LOCKE (Green) Link to this
In the first reading of the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill, the Green Party outlined its objections to this implementing legislation for the New Zealand - China free-trade agreement. In the minority report back from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee there is a summary of the Green Party’s objections. In this second reading speech I want to talk about the timing of this bill and the signing of the free-trade treaty, in the light of the pressure that is being put on the Chinese Government internationally to improve its human rights record around the time of the holding of the Olympic Games in Beijing.
I would like to say in relation to some of Tim Groser’s comments that the Green Party is not against trade with China, and it is not against trade agreements with China per se, but that we believe it is very bad timing for us now to be signing a preferential trade agreement that gives the Chinese regime advantage at the very time when it is so violating the human rights of its citizens and international attention is on China around the time of the Olympics. It is our view that if enough pressure goes on to the Chinese Government during this period, we might be able to give extra leverage to the many millions of Chinese who are trying to achieve greater freedoms. For this bill to go through at this time is a betrayal of the international movement that is pressing for greater democracy in China.
Let us now look at the background to that international movement. Back in June 2001, when Beijing was trying to get the games, its mayor, Liu Qi, said the games “will also benefit the further development of our human rights”. Jacques Rogge, the president of the International Olympic Committee, told the BBC on 23 April 2002: “We at the IOC urge the Chinese Government to improve, as soon as possible, their record in human rights. However, the IOC is a responsible organisation, and if either security, logistics, or human rights are not acted upon to our satisfaction, then we will act.” There should have been action, because the Olympic Charter projects its sporting competition as being “with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” It further states: “Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.” That refers to belonging to the Olympic movement, yet here we are talking about a host country for an Olympic Games.
Can we really say there is no discrimination on the basis of race, when we think of the treatment meted out recently to the Tibetan people; can we say there is no discrimination on the basis of religion, when monks are beaten and arrested, and when we think of the persecuted Falun Gong practitioners; and can we say there is no discrimination on the basis of politics, when we think of the many thousands of people imprisoned in China, simply for dissenting with the Government in various ways? But when has there been action from the International Olympic Committee? The main concern of that body seems to be to prevent protests on human rights issues at Olympic venues by athletes or officials or anyone else. The New Zealand Olympic Committee, unfortunately, has backed the International Olympic Committee on that, going beyond the Olympic Charter and even warning New Zealand athletes that a protest could be defined as something that happens at the New Zealand athletes’ accommodation.
All of that inaction is despite the fact that in some ways the human rights situation in China has become worse in the lead-up to the Olympics. It is worse than it was in 2001, when the Mayor of Beijing made that statement about human rights. It is worse for the Tibetan people. Their peaceful protests back in March were brutally crushed, and many monks are still in jail. Freedom of movement—a crucial right—is denied to most Tibetans. The foreign media is largely shut out of Tibet, despite the fact that Sun Weijia, the head of Beijing’s media operation for the Olympics, said on 27 September 2006: “We have no restrictions on travel for foreign journalists in China, so once they get the visa they can travel anywhere in China.” That is not the case. Some foreign journalists have been hassled or even arrested for reporting outside acceptable bounds, such as reporting on the faith of dissidents.
It makes a joke of human rights at the Olympics for Chinese democrats like Ye Guozhu, Hu Jia, and Yang Chunlin to be imprisoned specifically because they stated publicly their intention to raise human rights issues during the Olympics period. They were chucked in jail. A pre-Olympic crackdown on dissenters has been going on—a clean-up, as they call it—and we have seen the arbitrary detention of many petitioners, human rights activists, and the like. We do not know the full details of that, and one thing that our Government and the international movement should be demanding is the full details of all of those people and what they have been arrested for. They should also be demanding the release of those people. The media has not been granted access to those details.
Some of the people who have been arrested, both recently and over the years, have been treated quite brutally. There is a programme, with about 300,000 people in it by some Chinese reports, called “re-education through labour”. It is forced labour that sometimes involves ordinary prisoners, but at other times involves political dissidents and many thousands of members of the Falun Gong organisation in particular, whose crime is to insist that their organisation be independent of the Communist Party of China and not be under its control. For that reason they are deemed to be part of an organisation that is illegal and is, effectively, to be crushed. Some dissidents have been killed. It is clear that in terms of the exercise of capital punishment, which is something New Zealand is very much against, the Chinese Government is the largest executioner in the world today.
So this is not the time to be signing a preferential trade agreement with the Chinese Government, particularly in the situation where we can make some progress around the time of the Olympic Games. The memorandum of understanding associated with the treaty on labour issues is a very weak one. It just involves discussions between officials if something comes up—not even ministerial meetings, as in the Thai - New Zealand free-trade agreement. There is a reference in the memorandum to the ILO commitments. Those commitments include things like allowing free association of people or unions, and being against forced labour, being against child labour, and being against discrimination in employment. Those things are non-evident in China. There is a very weak provision—much weaker than the Thai - New Zealand free-trade agreement provision, which states: “The Parties respect their sovereign rights to set their own policies and national priorities and to set, administer and enforce their own labour laws and regulations.” Well, in the case of China that means very weak regulations in terms of protecting labour rights.
This bill and the treaty it implements are not good for the human rights of Chinese working people. They are not good for the Chinese people as a whole. It is quite the wrong time for us to take this step, at a time when our Prime Minister and others should be getting behind the international campaign to help democracy in China.
HONE HARAWIRA (Māori Party—Te Tai Tokerau) ) Link to this
Tēnā koe, Mr Assistant Speaker. Tēnā tātou e te Whare. Hoi nō, i te hui ā-tau o te Rōpū Haina ki Aotearoa i tērā tau, i puta te kōrero a te Ahorangi a Mākere Mutu, kia mahi tahi te Māori me te Hainamana, kia haere whakamua wā raua wawata, haerenga tangata. Tū, he uri nō Ngāti Kahu, nō Te Rarawa, nō Ngāti Whātua hoki, a nāna te kī, kua hōhonu haere te whanaungatanga i waenganui i te Māori me te iwi o Haina. Ki a ia, ka puta tēnei whanaungatanga i te mahi kaikiri a tauiwi, ki a ia, “Kei te pēhiakei te whakaparahakotia tāua tahi.”Tērā te piri tahi e whakaaro nei au, i au e wānanga ana i tēnei pire, arā, te Pire Hokohoko, Kore Utu o Aotearoa me Haina. E hangaia ana he ara kia watea ai te uru atu o ngā taonga hokohoko me nga pūtea whakangao ki Haina; ā, a tōna wā, kia tangohia ngā here utu kei runga i ngā taonga o Niu Tīreni, me te whakawatea anō i te haere o ngā kaipakihi ki Haina. I nāianei, kua tau mai te honore he whenua aronui a Aotearoa me ōna tikanga kore here, kia ōrite wā tātou kaiwhakarato moni, ki wērā ake o te ao.
Ko te kōrero, ka pēnei i te mea, koia nei te oranga mō Aotearoa. Nā te aha i riro i a tātou te tūnga whenua aronui? Nā te aha i riro i a tātou tērā tūnga, hakoa mai rā nō tō mātou whakaiti i a rātou i roto i ngā ture, me ngā kaupapa, hei kati kia noho-ki-waho, wērā e kīa nei e te tuhinga tawhito, ko te “taniwha kōwhai”? He kōrero tawhito tēnei kia kaua te Hainama e uru mai nei, ki Niu Tīreni. Ka kitea ēnei kōrero i te tatau taake i te tau 1881, e ōrite ana ki te utu o te Hainamana mō ngā tau e whā, ki te ono. Kotahi rau pauna kia haere mai ki konei, kia utaina ngā kōrero whakaparahako ki runga i a rātou, ngā kōrero he paruparu, he tahumaero, he tāhawahawa, ā, he whakakinotanga. I whakaritea ko te tekau mā rima anake ngā Hainamana, kia haere mai i runga tima i te wā kotahi. I tohua anō he whakamātautau kia mōhio mai rātou i ngā kupu Ingarihi kotahi rau, engari i tupurangi te whiriwhiri o te kupu. Tae atu ki te tau 1920, i tohua mai te tiwhikete whakaaetanga anake, ka uru mai.
Tae atu ki te tau 1925, i tohua te Kāwanatanga kia kaua te wahine e uru mai, kia kore tōna iwi e whakarahi atu. Tae atu ki te tau 1951, e kore taea te Hainamana kia tū hei iwi whenua, ā, tae atu ki te tau 1965, ka taea tonu te pirihimana kia uru atu ki roto i ngā whare a te Hainamana i raro i te ture Rahui i te Rongoa Whakamoe, hakoa horekau he pukapuka whakaae. Ka mutu, ko ngā ture kaikiri, kia kore ai ngā toa hoko hua rākau, horoi kākahu, hoko kai hoki o te Hainamana e tukituki i ngā toa o te Pākehā. Nā, i runga i tēnei momo hītori, kaikiri, whakahāwea i ngā Hainamana, he aha te take e tino hiakai ana tēnei kāwanatanga, kia whakaritea i tētahi tiriti kia Haina. He aha te tikanga nei, kia hurikōaro te kotahi rau tau o ngā whakaiti, tūkinotia, kia hoa tahi tātou ki a Haina? Maumahara mai ki ngā kupu a Mutu: “Kei te pēhia, kei te whakaparahakotia, tāua tahi.”
Kotahi anake te kaupapa hei tautoko i tēnei pire. Kia peke ki te tuarā o tēnei whenua tino kaha rawa, kia wātea ai te iwi nui nei hei hoko taonga. Ko te wawata kia whai moni a Niu Tīreni i te iwi rawa, o Haina. Engari, he whakaaetanga koura tēnei, kāhore rānei? Kāhore te rōpū whakawā i mōhio, mēnā ka kite koe i ngā kōrero i tae mai ki te komiti hei whakatau. 15 i tautoko, 12 ki runga tonu i te taiapa, 27 e kore e whakaae. Ahakoa te tini o ngā yuan i te ao, kore taea te whakarere kē, he nui ake wērā e kore whakaae, ki wērā i whakaae. Ka hoki mai ki tērā rere kētanga, o te tūunga whenua aronui i tētahi ringa, ki te mahi whakahāwea tangata i tērā atu.
I whakaae ake te komiti whakawā, ko te tikanga a te tangata i Haina a “he nui, herahi ōna raruraru”. I whakaae taua komiti i mōhio rātou ki ngā āwangawanga kua kōrerohia mō ngā mahi takahi tangata i Haina. Engari, i te mutunga ki ngā pāti nui, horekau he āwangawanga. Tika ana te whakarāpopoto a Unite. Ko te “FTA” nei, he kaupapa mō te painga o ngā kaipakihi, ehara mō te painga o ngā kaimahi, ngā whānau, ngā iwi kei tāwāhi, kei te kāinga rānei. Ko ngā whakaaro mō rātau, kei muri noa atu. E whakapono ana a Unite, ko te “FTA” nei, he mahi tukituki kia whakaiti te utu o ngā kaimahi o konei, i te whakataetae utu mō ngā taonga o Haina. Nā te mahi a ngā kaipakihi nui i waho atu o te ture o tēnei whenua, ka whakaiti te mana o te kāwanatanga whakahaere ā-iwi, rangatiratanga hoki.
Ki tā Ahorangi Jane Kelsey ki te komiti, ko te mate o te tohu whenua aronui, koia ko te hinga o te rangatiratanga o te kāwanatanga, i a “FTA”. Ahakoa e whakahokia mai ana te mana whakahaere o ngā kaupapa ā-tangata ki te kāwanatanga, i te mea, e kore te kaupapa mākete e whakamana nei i a Niu Tīreni, engari, ko te “FTA” nei kua rere kē atu ki taua whakapono.
Kore taea e mātou o Te Pāti Māori te tautoko i tēnei pire. He nui wā mātou āwangawanga mō ngā mahi takahi tangata a Haina. He āwangawanga hoki mō ngā taonga ka utaina e Haina ki runga i a tātou. He āwangawanga tā mātou mō ngā mahi kia ngaro. He mahi tinihanga hoki tēnei kia tukua mai te pepa nei kia tirohia. Kua oti te whakarite me pēhea rā te haere, kua tāmokohia ngā pepa. Kua oma kē te hōiho, he moumou taima te kati i te kēti. E mara whakamutua atu. Ko te iti o te utu, ko te kore e aro ki ngā kaupapa whakaruru kaimahi, ko te kore e manaaki i te taiao, ko ngā taumahatanga ka tau ki runga i ō tātou kaimahi, ko ēnei katoa ngā āhuatanga, e kore mātou e tautokongia i tēnei pire.
Kua rongo ripoata mātou, e rima miriona ngā tamariki i raro i te tau tekau mā rima, e mahi ana mō ngā hāora roroa, mō te utu iti noa. E rima miriona ngā take nei, kia kaua mātou e tautoko i tēnei pire. Ko ngā iwi whenua e kore nei i kitea i ngā Whakataetae o te Ao, te tini o rātou nō Tibet kua mauheretia. E kore taea te aro ake mō ērā momo mahi tūkino.
Me mihi atu ki ngā kaipakihi Māori, ngā rōpū ā-iwi hoki, e whai ana i te oranga mō o rātou ake uri, kia whai whakaaro, kia whai pūtea mō rātou. Kei a rātou tērā, ā, e mōhio ana mātou ka taea e rātou te whakanui i tō rātou ake pūtea. E mōhio anō hoki mātou, ko te tū o te kaipakihi he mea nui ki te Māori, ā, e tautoko ano mātou i taua whāinga. Engari, e titiro tonu ana mātou ki ngā taumahatanga, ka tau mai ki runga i nga papakāinga Māori, rātou te pani me te rawakore, rātou e kore e kitea i ngā painga, e māturuturu mai nei i ngā mahi kaipakihi. E tautoko ana mātou, kia tōtika te utu mō te taonga engari, e kore tautoko i te kōrero kia kore utu nei. E tautoko ana mātou i te whakangao e whānuitia ana tōna painga, me te mea anō e hiahia ana mātou kia kitea, ko ngā wāhi mahi i konei i Haina hoki, he wāhi pai mō ngā kaimahi. E kore e taea e mātou te nohopuku, ina maukinohia ngā kaimahi i tāwāhi mō te painga o tō tātou ao, ā, kore hoki mātou e noho pōhēhē ana, e tiaki ana te pire nei i wā tātou kaipakihi. E hiahia ana mātou kia mōhio, ka tu tonu te Māori hei iwi motuhake i raro i te whakaruruhau o tōna Tiriti o Waitangi. Me te mōhio anō hoki, ka taea te pire nei ki te whakamarumaru, ki te whakanui anō rā i tō mātou whenua me ōna iwi i mua noa atu i te painga mō ngā kaipakihi nunui o te ao. Tēnā koe, Mr Assistant Speaker, kia ora tātou katoa.
[An interpretation in English was given to the House.]
[At the annual conference of the New Zealand Chinese Association last year, Professor Margaret Mutu told the hui that Māori and Chinese should work together to advance their political agendas. She stands as one of Ngāti Kahu, Te Rarawa, and Ngāti Whatua genealogy, and told the conference of the significant relationship that had developed between tangata whenua and Chinese. It was, in her words, a relationship formed in reaction to Pākehā racism: “We areboth oppressed and discriminated against.” It is that relationship I think of in considering the New Zealand - China Free Trade Agreement Bill. The pathway is being set for increasing access for New Zealand trade and investment in China—for the removal over time of tariffs on current exports to China, from expanding the movement of business people. We are now being honoured with the treatment of a most favoured nation non-discrimination provision to ensure that our investors remain no worse off than investors of any other countries.
It is all being painted as a major development, as fundamental to the future economic well-being of Aotearoa. How did we achieve most favoured nation status? How could we achieve this, based on a history of consistently passing laws against the Chinese, of creating policies to restrict and exclude what the history books describe as the “yellow peril”? This is a history to keep the Chinese out of New Zealand. a history that derives its source from the 1881 poll tax, which was the equivalent of between 4 and 6 years’ earning for a Chinese person at the time. One hundred pounds to come here, to be subjected to attitudes associating Chinese people with terms like filth, dirt, disease, contamination, and degradation! L imits were set on the numbers of Chinese able to travel to New Zealand—a limit of only 15 Chinese passengers per ship. A reading test of 100 English words chosen at random was imposed, and in 1920 entry was allowed by permit only.
In 1925, the Government decided to exclude women from the quota, in an effort to prevent reproduction. Up until 1951, the Chinese were not allowed to be naturalised; and up until 1965, under the Opium Prohibition Act, police were able to enter any Chinese home without a search warrant. Finally, a series of laws were passed to stop Chinese fruit shops, laundries, and groceries from competing against Europeans. So how is it that in a land with such a shameful history of exclusion and institutional racism against the Chinese, the Government is suddenly bending over backwards to become party to a treaty with China? What has been the dramatic turn-round to reverse over a century of racism into a determination to develop ties with the region? Remember Margaret Mutu’s words: “We are both oppressed and discriminated against.”
There is one motive for this free-trade agreement. It is about jumping on the back of an economic superpower and gaining access to the largest consumer market in the world. It is about the forlorn hope that New Zealand will make money from the wealth of a burgeoning Chinese middle class. But is this agreement all it is worth in gold, or not? The jury is out, when we look through the submissions that came into the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. Fifteen supported it; 12 abstained, and 27 opposed the deal. All the yuan in the world doesn’t change the fact that the numbers of “No” votes outnumbered the “Yes” votes. It comes back to the fundamental mismatch between being most favoured nation on one hand, with a past that is less worthy.
The select committee acknowledged that, yes, the human rights record in China has “many and substantial imperfections”. The select committee acknowledged, yes, they were very conscious about the legitimate concerns raised about human rights in China. But when cash came to crunch, major parties did not care. Unite summed it up. The free-trade agreement policy is designed to serve interests of big business, with the interests of workers, of families, the people abroad or at home who have to suffer the consequences being very much a secondary concern. Unite believes that the free-trade agreement will create competition and drive our own internal wages and work conditions down, as firms struggle to compete with Chinese imports. The opportunity for big business to trade outside of Government influence or control, in its effects, serves to both erode democracy and economic sovereignty.
What Professor Jane Kelsey also brought to the attention of the committee is that the most favoured nation obligations mean that each new free-trade agreement will have the domino effect of removing foreign investments further from control of Parliament. So at a time when the Government is reregulating services and resuming State ownership because the market model does not serve the national interest, it is acting in quite the other direction in pursuing free-trade agreements such as this.
The Māori Party cannot support this bill. We have ongoing concerns about China’s human rights record. We have ongoing concerns about the potential for China to dump goods on our domestic markets. We have ongoing concerns about the potential loss of jobs in our manufacturing sector. And we believe that being allowed the opportunity to scrutinise the free-trade agreement at this stage of the proceedings, only after it has been signed, makes the whole select committee process a farce. The cheap labour, the weak health, safety, and environmental standards, the poor protection of workers, the adverse impacts that will be suffered by New Zealand workers, are all reasons why we cannot support this bill.
The reports of some 5 million Chinese children under the age of 15, lumbered with long hours for low pay, are 5 million more reasons why we are voting against this bill. The dissidents being hidden out of the radar of the Olympic spotlight, the hundreds of Tibetans being imprisoned, the international stigma of China’s human rights issues, cannot simply be ignored.
We fully respect the right of organisations, of iwi, of Māori businesses, to take up the opportunity to pursue their own best interests, and to return dividends to Māori shareholders. That is their prerogative, and we are confident that they will be very competitive and achieve impressive returns. We believe that economic growth is essential for Māori businesses to succeed, and we will support them all the way. But we are also charged with looking out for the impacts on Māori communities, especially those who may be least resilient and least likely to benefit from the trickle down of economic growth. We support fair trade, not free trade. We seek socially responsible investment. We want to see the provision of healthy and safe working conditions both here and in China. And we cannot sit by and be silent when workers overseas may be exploited to benefit our economy, or pretend that New Zealand industry and services will be protected. We must know that the rights of Māori will be actively protected, as provided for under the Treaty of Waitangi And we need to ensure that our laws serve to protect and enhance our nation, not globalist agendas. Greetings to you, Mr Assistant Speaker, and to us all. ]
JOHN HAYES (National—Wairarapa) Link to this
I say to my colleague in the Māori Party that there is no fairer trade than free trade, simply because nobody has their fingers in the pie or the till, and I would like the member to think about that as we go through the rest of this debate.
This legislation is the most important legislation introduced during the life of this Parliament over the last 3 years. I think it is one of the most important bilateral and commercial agreements ever negotiated by a New Zealand Government—certainly since the Closer Economic Relations agreement with Australia was signed 25 years ago.
I would like to go back to comments made in this House by my colleague Mr Woolerton of the New Zealand First Party, who challenged the National Party and other parties in this House to explain why this agreement was so important and to outline the benefits that it would bring to the people of this country—be they Māori, be they Pākehā, or be they any other ethnicity. Well, let me say this. In the work completed by the joint study group within the Government that focused on the returns that would come from this agreement, it was measured that over a 20-year period, from about 2007 to 2027, New Zealand exports to China were expected to grow between $180 million to $280 million a year. Chinese exports to New Zealand were also expected to grow by an annual average of between $40 million to $70 million a year over that same period. If we think of that in percentage terms, this equates to New Zealand exports to China increasing by between 20 percent and 39 percent above the baseline and Chinese exports to New Zealand increasing by between 5 percent and 11 percent.
For the benefit of listeners, I say that before our tea break I responded to my colleague Hone Harawira, who said that the Māori Party supported fair trade, not free trade. I said to him that there was no fairer trade than free trade.
For the benefit of the Māori Party, and the member of the Green Party who is squawking from the sidelines, I say that I think they both need a crash course in economics. The point to understand about a free market, I say to the Green Party, the Māori Party, and also New Zealand First, is that buyer and seller can opt out of a transaction. There is no compulsion. A transaction will not go ahead in a free market unless the thing someone is buying is worth more to that person than the asking price. So in a free market no one is forcing a transaction. That means that a free market improves efficiency, because the transaction makes both parties better off.
Doug Woolerton from New Zealand First challenged the House just prior to the tea break to prove that Fonterra and the dairy farmers would be better off with this agreement. For New Zealand First’s benefit I rattled into my papers during the tea break. I will quote from the Fonterra submission to our select committee, and I will table it at the end of this speech. Essentially, it stated: “Within weeks of the signature of the agreement, we have already seen a concrete and commercially very valuable example of these benefits. Since it was announced that tariffs on nutritional milk powders … will be eliminated by 2012, and despite strong competition from other countries, Fonterra has been able to secure an agreement to supply these products to a large multinational customer directly from New Zealand. We expect this business to generate revenue in excess of $300m over the next four years. These value-added dairy products will be manufactured in NZ factories using NZ milk, capital, labour and technology. Without the FTA with China, lower priced product from New Zealand would almost certainly have had to have been processed offshore in Asia.” However, I have digressed.
The National Party supports this legislation because it knows that New Zealand interests are global interests. If we are to improve the prosperity of our communities, if we are to stop the outward flow reported in this morning’s Dominion Post, which was recorded as being 80,000 people turning their backs on this country and its Government each year—its overbearing Government, I suspect—we must look outward with clear priorities. New Zealand must secure access to the markets of growing economies. Trade access for producers and manufacturers will do most to improve wealth for our people. To maximise our effectiveness as a country with limited resources but global interests, we must continually and carefully prioritise our foreign affairs effort.
Asia is a very vitally important part of our region. It is crucial to our longer-run security and prosperity. As China and India continue to grow, we can expect geopolitical weight to shift towards Asia. China’s economic growth for three decades has been exceptional. Millions of people have been lifted out of poverty because of pragmatic reforms made by the Chinese Government. This free-trade agreement, which this House will pass this week, will deepen the relationship between our countries and improve market access for businesses trading in both directions. As China grows it will need resources to fuel its economy. This drive for resources—timber, food, and particularly energy—will underpin China’s growing presence in our region, and it highlights why this relationship is of such vital importance to New Zealand.
The free-trade agreement with China will give us access on reasonable terms, but this is no guarantee of success. We still need to get our tax levels competitive, we need our infrastructure to be up to scratch, and we need our education system—including Mākōura College in Masterton—delivering acceptable results if we are to turn trade access into economic access. We also have to be pursuing other trade agreements, particularly with Japan, with Korea, and with America. I think that we have to put huge effort into doing this, because freeing up international trade over the last 40 years, since we signed the CER agreement, has been a key driver for New Zealand’s economic growth.
Global negotiations for the World Trade Organization (WTO) round are at a crucial stage, but I do not think that they will deliver commercially meaningful outcomes. But trade—trade liberalisation, particularly—involves more than the WTO. The last 20 years has seen a plethora of free-trade agreements signed between countries on a bilateral basis and also by groups of countries. Their very nature is that they are exclusive. I have said previously in this House that the greatest risk to our future is that we are excluded from bilateral free-trade agreements signed up between other countries—for example, America and Australia’s bilateral agreement. If we are excluded, then we are in a very difficult position; we are cut right out. So our trade policy effort must be designed to mitigate that risk.
At a bilateral level the major gap in our free-trade policy architecture, as I have said, is a lack of free-trade agreements with our major partners: the US, Japan, and Korea. We have to pursue those with all the vigour, resources, political bureaucracy, and research institutes—including universities and businesses—that we can muster. It will be a long and daunting task, which can be achieved only by a coordinated “New Zealand Inc.” approach—a cooperative partnership—which is why we are working in a cross-party manner tonight on this bill. We are doing that because our future absolutely depends on it. Viewed against this background it is obvious why the National Party actively and unambiguously supports the ratification of the China - New Zealand free-trade agreement.
I will make just one other point in commenting again on earlier speakers who have said that there is a lot of opposition to this trade agreement. I can tell members that I have gone around the Wairarapa electorate and I have knocked on doors. I can tell the House that there is huge support for this agreement, particularly from farmers, but also from people like John Whitehead of Whitehead Productions in Masterton—
—which manufacturers a lot of stuff for the military, I say to Mr Mark. It makes a lot of clothing for the military. That industry has adjusted because it has already been exposed to tariff reductions. The only industries that I could find that will potentially suffer from this agreement are those like the Stihl dealers, which have their very good products having to compete with the $10 gardening-type equipment that comes from China. Thank you very much, Mr Assistant Speaker, for giving me the opportunity to support this bill.
A party vote was called for on the question,
That the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Bill be now read a second time.
Ayes 104
- New Zealand Labour 49
- New Zealand National 48
- United Future 2
- ACT New Zealand 2
- Progressive 1
- Independent 2 (Copeland, Field)
Noes 17
Bill read a second time.
JOHN HAYES (National—Wairarapa) Link to this
I seek leave to table the submission on the free-trade agreement between New Zealand and China prepared by Fonterra.